In order to explain the transformation that Islam went through since the rise of Shi‘ism, Muslim and non-Muslim historians point to two factors derived from the same cause: the political struggle for the Caliphate. The first factor was that the political influence of the oligarchy transformed itself into a timocratic power, a state in which political power increases with the amount of property one owns, through the support of the triumphant majority. The second factor was that the political will of a marginalized minority became a medium of resistance. Depending on the personal inclinations of previous researchers, they argue in favor of one of these two factors. For us, both factors are two aspects of the same cause. For Western research scholars, it is not always easy to get used to the idea that in Islam, the relationship between the religion and politics is much closer than it is in the West between the Church and the State. It is even more difficult for them to accept that in Shi‘ism religion and politics are two aspects of the orthodox development of the same doctrine, rather than parallel or separate tendencies that revolve around the same sphere but without any effective connection between them.
“Recent studies,” says Bausani, “distinguish more between a political Shi‘ism, which included the purely political partisans of ‘Ali and his family…, a religious Shi‘ism, which included activists impregnated with Gnostic ideas, who were based mostly in Kufa, in Mesopotamia, and whose main representative … was the politico-religious agitator al-Mukhtar who took over Kufah in 685-686. He preached Messianic doctrines and started some very interesting customs like the cult of the vacant throne and so forth”
(112-113). As a result of these events, some Orientalists attempted to establish a clear distinction between an “extremist” political Shi‘ism, a “moderate” religious Shi‘ism and an “intermediate” Shi‘ism. This latter, which shares both political and religious aspects, is at times “extremist” and at others “moderate” according to Bausani’s definition of Twelver Shi‘ism. It comes as no surprise that, centuries after the birth of Shi‘ism, Orientalists seeking support for the “democratic” orientation of Abu Bakr would use this inappropriate division to supposedly distinguish between a political Shi‘ism and a religious Shi‘ism.[1]
The origins and early development of Shi‘ite Islam is, to a great extent, a history of divisions, dissensions and internal quarrels relating to the problem of succession. A considerable number of movements, some of which went from partial or relative dissidence to outright rupture [fitnah], were drawn into the center of this great storm as a result of the violence of the political and religious authorities. It must be mentioned, however, that while some of these groups may have reached the state of sects [furuq] in the Christian sense of the world, in our view, even this barrier between differences does not produce clear-cut division. On the contrary, under this umbrella, many branches flourished, some longer-lived than others, which developed alongside Shi‘ism without breaking the tie, as weak as it may have been, with the Islamic trunk from which they were born.[2]
[1] Editor’s Note: This current which seeks to split Shi‘ism into fractions has even spread among Muslim scholars. Sachedina holds that Shi‘ism was a political movement which acquired religious undertones (Islamic Messianism 5). Jafri recognizes the division between political Shi‘ism and religious Shi‘ism (97) as does Rasul Ja‘fariyan who speaks of three forms of Shi‘ism: political, creedal and Iraqi. The truth of the matter, however, is that “Shi‘ism was a religious movement that also encompassed social and political aspects of society” (Rizvi Chapter 1).
[2] Editor’s Note: The author’s attitude is all-encompassing, eager to embrace, and stresses the common ground of tawhid on which all Muslims stand. This can be contrasted with Tijani’s attitude which seeks
In truth, the development of sects, that is, groups which diverge on the basis of important beliefs or practices, is the result of the closer ties established between Shi‘ism and the surrounding esoteric traditions. The divergence and conflict between the distinct groups is related to the reaction towards an ocean of doctrinal wealth. The Isma‘iliyyah,[1] for example, have a doctrine which, in many respects, makes them the inheritors of the Sabaean tradition of Harran which, as is known, was the depository of the Hermetic and neo-Pythagorean doctrines, which were combined with elements from Hindu occultism and Gnosis.[2] These Sabaeans must not be confused with the Sabaeans or Mandaeans from southern of Irak and Persia.[3]
more to splinter than to soothe, even rejecting the close legal, theological, philosophical and political ties which bind Twelvers, Seveners and Zaydis: “Our discussion does not invoke the other sects as Isma‘iliyyah and Zaydiyyah, as we believe in their being like other sects in not adhering to Hadith al-thaqalayn, and their belief in ‘Ali’s Imamah after the Messenger of Allah is of no use” (The Shi‘ah 331 Note 1). This attitude also ignores the similarities between Sunnism, Sufism and Shi‘ism. As M.G.S. Hodgson explains, “in its whole piety Sunni Islam can be called half-Shi‘ite” (4). Similarly, Nasr observes that “In certain areas of the Islamic world…one meets among Sufis certain groups as devoted to the Shi‘ite Imams, especially ‘Ali and Husayn, as any Shi‘ite could be, yet completely Sunni in their practice of the law [madhhab]” (Sufi Essays 107). In reality, these so-called “half-Shi‘ites” are neither one thing nor the other, but rather “seekers of the straight path.”
[1] Editor’s Note: The Isma‘iliyyah are known as Seveners as they follow Seven Imams, the first six Shi‘ite Imams and Isma‘il as the seventh.
[2] Editor’s Note: Some Isma‘iliyyah adapted the Qarmathian syncretist catechism to other forms of monotheism, to Harranian paganism, and even to Mazdeism (Massignon 60). As ‘Allamah Tabataba‘i notes, “The Isma‘ilis have a philosophy in many ways similar to that of the Sabaeans [star worshippers] combined with elements of Hindu gnosis” (Shi‘ite Islam 78).
[3] Editor’s Note: As Netton explains, “The Sabaeans were a pagan sect
One of the common mistakes made in relation to Shi‘ah Islam is the attempt to compare it with the various schisms found in Christianity. Shi‘ism is often portrayed as a schismatic coextension of dissident groups organized in small cells or brotherhoods driven by an uncompromising parochial spirit. The concept of inshi‘ab [division] in the Islamic religion must not be confused with that of fitnah, definitive division and irreparable rupture. In fact, Shi‘ism suffered no “division” [inshi‘ab] or rupture [fitnah] during the Imamate of the first three Imams: ‘Ali, Hasan and Husayn.
After the death of Husayn, however, the majority of Shi‘ites placed their trust in ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn Zayn al-‘abidin,[1] while a minority, known as al-Kaysaniyyah, believed that the right to succession belonged to Muhammad ibn al-Hanafiyyah. He was the third son of ‘Ali, but not through Fatimah. As a result, he cannot be considered a descendant of the Prophet.[2] Despite this fact, Muhammad ibn Hanafiyyah was proclaimed by his partisans as the Fourth Imam and the promised Mahdi. During the time he sought refuge in the mountains of Rawdah which form a cordillera in Madinah, Mukhtar al-Thaqifi served as his “representative.” It was believed that Muhammad ibn Hanafiyyah would come down one day and appear as the Rightly-Guided and Long-Awaited Messiah. In accordance with Shi‘ite thought, the Mahdi is a man motivated by God who is also a military chief and a warrior. Even
who, according to some, had cleverly identified themselves with the Sabi’un of the Qur’an to avoid persecution” (15). Harran, in what is now southeastern Turkey, was the home of the star worshipping Sabaeans with their transcendent philosophy. As for the Mandaeans, they are members of an ancient Gnostic sect surviving in southern Iraq and which used the Aramaic language in their writings.
[1] Editor’s Note: Zayn al-‘abidin is responsible for one of the great masterpieces of Shi‘ite supplications, al-Sahifah al-sajadiyyah, rendered beautifully into English by William Chittick as The Psalms of Islam.
[2] Author’s Note: He was the fruit of the marriage between the Imam and a woman from the Hanafi tribe, rather than from the Prophet’s daughter.
if the followers of Mukhtar al-Thaqifi gave an extremist character to the eschatological idea of the Hidden Imam, the Islamic figure of the Messiah as restorer of revealed religion is not an invention of Mukhtar or a Christian influence. The Mahdi is a spiritual synthesis of all revealed forms and not a mere uniform syncretism. It is a concept that is expressed in all its dimensions and depth in many ahadith of the Prophet as well as many traditions of the Imams.[1]
In synthesis, we can say that after the death of Imam Zayn al-‘abidin, the majority of Shi‘ites accepted Muhammad al-Baqir as the Fifth Imam, despite the fact that a minority followed his brother Zayd al-Shahid, who were known from that moment on as Zaydis.[2] Imam Muhammad al-Baqir was succeeded by his son Ja‘far al-Sadiq the Sixth Imam and, after his death, his son Musa al-Kadim was recognized as the Seventh Imam. Nevertheless, an opposition group insisted that the successor of the Sixth Imam was his elder son Isma‘il who had died when his father was still
[1] Editor’s Note: For more English-language books on the Mahdi, consult Shaykh al-Mufid’s Kitab al-irshad, Sachedina’s Islamic Messianism; An Inquiry Concerning al-Mahdi by Ayatullah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Discussions Concerning al-Mahdi by Ayatullah Lutfullah Safi al-Gulpaygani.
[2] Editor’s Note: The Zaydis are followers of Zayd ibn ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn, the son of the 4th Imam, who led a revolt against the Ummayads and was killed in 738. Initially, the Zaydis held that the true Imam was the Husaynid Imam who rose up in revolt. Many of the Zaydis accepted the Caliphate of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, and some even accepted the early part of ‘Uthman’s. This attitude was formulated in the theological doctrine of the Imamate of the mafdul [the less excellent]. It was agreed that ‘Ali was al-afdal [the most excellent] but conceded that the Imamate of the less excellent could occur when the most excellent did not publicly assert his right to the Imamate by armed revolt. For more on the beliefs of the Zaydis, see Howard’s “Introduction” to Shaykh al-Mufid Kitab al-Irshad (xxiii-xxv) and ‘Allamah Tabataba‘i’s Shi‘ite Islam (76-77).
alive.[1] This group split from the Shi‘ite majority and became known as the Isma‘ilis. Others, instead, preferred ‘Abdullah al-Aftah and some even chose Muhammad, both sons of the Sixth Imam. Still, there were even those who considered Ja’far al-Sadiq as the Last Imam and were convinced that none would succeed him. Likewise, after the martyrdom of Imam Musa al-Kadim, the majority followed his son ‘Ali al-Rida as the Eighth Imam. But there were those who refused to recognize any Imam after al-Kadim and came to constitute the brotherhood of the Waqifiyyah.[2] From the Eighth to the Twelfth Imam, considered by the Shi‘ite majority as the Awaited Mahdi, no important division [inshi‘ab] took place within Shi‘ism.
[1] Editor’s Note: Although the sources differ on the subject, Isma‘il may not have been qualified for the Imamate for several reasons: firstly, because his father Imam al-Sadiq had appointed Musa as his successor; secondly, because Isma‘il passed away before his father; and thirdly, because Isma‘il was an alcoholic. The Imamate is not a system of royalty or inheritance. It is a matter of divine pre-ordinance, a covenant from Allah. The tradition from the Sixth Imam, “There was no bada’ [lit. “appearance” from ibda which means “to bring about”] for Allah like the bada’ in the case of my son Isma‘il” (Muzaffar 14) gives the impression that Imam Sadiq appointed his son Isma‘il as his successor. Since the Shi‘ites do not believe in bada’, namely, God giving the impression of something and then changing it, there are two possibilities here: 1) the tradition in question is false or 2) is to be interpreted as follows:
The meaning of the saying of Imam Sadiq is that Allah has not revealed any matter…in the case of Isma‘il (the son of Imam Sadiq), by taking his life before he took his father’s. This was so that people would understand that Isma‘il was not the Imam, although it had appeared in the situation as if he were, because he was the eldest son.(14)
In any event, the Sixth Imam did not designate his eldest son to be his successor, nor did it cause a great doctrinal or theological problem among the Shi‘ah.
[2] Editor’s Note: The Waqifites were those who held that Musa was the Imam who would return as the Madhi.
However it occured, what is important to retain here is that, since its origins, Shi‘ite Islam represents, more than a spiritual and political rebellion against illegitimate authority, a movement of “awakening,” like that of Sufism in the Sunni world. It was not a reformist movement in the Christian sense, like the one that took place in Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries. Shi‘ite Islam represents an integral restoration of Muhammadan theosophy and metaphysics through the application and practice of all the teachings of the Holy Imams, who linked the outer meanings of the text to the inner meanings of the divine word.
The root cause for the development of Shi‘ism is utterly alien from worldly affairs. The source of Shi‘ism is not a simple heresy or a political disagreement. Shi‘ite Islam springs from a metaphysical reality, a process of epiphany which establishes a new logophonic manifestation of prophethood. Shi‘ism, as the Islam of ‘Ali and the ahl al-bayt, is the temporal and earthly pillar of the eternal and celestial reality of the wilayah. The wilayah, the spiritual guidance of the Imams, is a manifestation of prophethood. The wilayah is an inner or occult reality which is found in potential and action within the same prophethood. The wilayah is a manifestation of prophethood that is revealed in a new way. The wilayah is not the renovation of the anterior Qur’anic revelation but its closure. The wilayah is an unveiling of the esoteric and metaphysical truths found in the Qur’an. While the Prophet sealed the age of formal revelation, by means of the divine concession of the wilayah and the Imamate to his descendants, a new age of profound “revelations” was opened.[1] Just as the plerema of the Twelve Imams represents the fullness
[1] Editor’s Note: The belief in post-prophetic guidance is not exclusively Shi‘ite. It is related in Sunni traditions that the Messenger of Allah said: “Surely Messengership and Prophethood are terminated, so there will be no messenger or prophet after me except mubashshirat” (Tirmidhi). He also stated that: “There is nothing to come of prophethood except mubashshirat.” People asked, “What are they?” The Holy Prophet replied, “True visions” and these were declared by the Holy Prophet to be one forty-sixth of prophethood (Bukhari).
of the Muhammadan Reality, their teachings and doctrines are flashes from the sole Muhammadan Light, the logophonic effusions and manifestations of the Qur’anic revelation: its perfect synthesis and exact formulation.
Finally, in order for there to be a living branch from the Islamic trunk, a favorable doctrinal terrain was required, a spiritual identity with its own characteristics which were qualitatively different from the other ideological options of its age. With such an understanding, the historical appearance of Shi‘ism seems to be completely inevitable. Without its presence, of course, the history of Islam and the world would have totally changed. In our judgment, any attempt to reduce the historical development of Shi‘ism to a mere political problem related to the succession or to some insurgent elements is misguided at best. This applies to figures as fictitious as ‘Abdullah ibn Saba, the Yemenite of Jewish extraction, and as real and historical as Mukhtar al-Thaqifi.
Abdullah ibn Saba and Mukhtar al-Thaqifi are presented by Alessandro Bausani as “extremists” [ghulat][1] and precursors of a
[1] Editor’s Note: Ghulat, plural of ghali, is an Arabic term deriving from the verb ghala which means “to exaggerate or exceed the proper bounds.” The verbal noun is ghuluw and means “exaggeration.” The ghulat or extremists are sects which deify ‘Ali. In Iran, they are known as the Ahl al-Haqq [people of the truth], ‘Ali Ilahis [‘Ali worshippers]: in Iraq they are called Shabak, Bajwan, Sarliyya, Kkaiyya, and Ibrahimiyyah. In Syria, they are known as Nusayris or ‘Alawis. In Turkey, they are called Bektashis, Kizilbash (Alevis), Takhtajis and Çepnis. The Shaykhis are also a modern ghulat group. They are followers of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i (d. 1830) who taught that the infallible fourteen are the cause of the universe, in whose hands are the life and death and the livelihood of humanity. According to Moosa, al-Ahsa’i seems to justify this belief by explaining that God is too transcendent to operate the universe by Himself and therefore deputized the infallible fourteeen to operate the universe on his behalf (109). If this is correct, the Shaykhis ressemble the mufawwidah [the delegators]. As Fyzze explains,
The mufawwidah are those who believe that God created the Prophet
and ‘Ali and then ceased to function. Thereafter it was these two who arranged everything in the world. They create and sustain and destroy; Allah has nothing to do with these things. (141).
When examining the Shayhis, it is important to differentiate between the Baha’i-controlled group from the original teachings of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i. As far as Shi‘ism is concerned, there is no doubt that the Imams are the Lords of Existence. What happens with Ahmad al-Ahsa’i is that he developed entirely esoteric doctrines and many have understood him literally without understanding that the ideas he was expressing were metaphysical rather that philosophical or theological. For Gnostics, the role of the Imams is viewed cosmically. There is no doubt that the Babis and Baha’is have misinterpreted this role in an extreme fashion, the first in a esoteric way, and the latter in a literal way, distorting the doctrines of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i. The Universal Legislator is the one who initiates a cycle and brings it to its end. He does not destroy the world in a physical sense but in a historical one. He closes one cycle and commences a second. The Imams closed the Cycle of Prophecy only to initiate the Cycle of the Walayah. Imam Mahdi will come to close the Cycle of Walayah of the Prophet Muhammad. If Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i said that the Imams controlled the universe, he said so in the sense of prophetic hadith which states that without an Imam, the world would be destroyed and would not last a single second. There are also other Sunni and Shi‘ite traditions regarding Imam ‘Ali, making it clear that the Imam is center or heart of the world without whose presence the world would stop to exist. There is also the hadith which states that when Imam Mahdi returns, reason would leave the world and humanity would degenerate into destruction. The work of Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsa’i need to be re-examined from a Twelver Shi‘ite perspective. This is the only way his scholarship can be saved from Babi-Baha’i interpretations which have distorted his original doctrines.
As for the ghulat, they are of different ethnic origins, speak different languages and are divided into different denominations, they share the common belief in the apotheosis of ‘Ali and in a trinity of God, Muhammad and ‘Ali or, as among the Nusayris, of ‘Ali, Muhammad and Salman al-Farsi. They practice holy communion and public or private confession. According to Moosa Matti, “[t]heir religion is a syncretism of extreme Shi‘ite, pagan, and Christian beliefs, and they fall outside the pale of orthodox Islam” (418). In fact, “some of the beliefs of the ghulat
political Shi‘ism. Muslim and non-Muslim specialists have long disputed which one deserves the inappropriate title of “founder of Shi‘ite Islam.” The Italian Orientalist briefly refers to ‘Abdullah ibn Saba as an exalted personality, an ex-Jewish Yemenite who
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