The Iranian Islamism, a Model towards Stability in the Muslim World-2

In Iran, a subtle but profoundly important dialogue over the essence and proper functions of the state has been emerging now for more than a decade. Though this dialogue was never fully extinguished, only after the end of the war with Iraq in 1988 and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 could it move out of private homes and into popular publications and, more recently, into some corners of the state. The specific ideological dispositions of its articulator notwithstanding, the main parameters of Iran’s emerging democratic dialogue concern proper notions and functions of civil society and the rule of law. With the discourse on civil society still evolving, and facing innumerable governmental and unofficial obstacles, it is not yet clear how Iran’s writers, politicians, and other politically minded actors define civil society and democracy. Nevertheless, notions such as (cultural) “reformation,” political accountability, and freedom of expression predominate in much of the writing of the country’s most popular public intellectuals.
At the same time, the evolving discourse is keenly aware of, and is in significant ways shaped by, the pervasiveness of religion at all levels of Iranian life, rural and urban, rich and poor, politically apathetic or aware. Whatever “democracy” this debate may one day bring, it will surely be deeply imbued with religion. In Iran, the situation is quite different from the other countries in the Middle East. The election of reformist President Muhammad Khatami in 1997 the pace and intensity of the state-approved debate over civil society could be influenced only by extreme measures that were never taken.
The Islamic Republic of Iran represents a form of parliamentary democracy as defined by Iranians, although a uniquely brand of democracy for the western eye. Its progress manifested throughout its existence as a republic, in the light of Mahdism teaching is a promise and an example for the Muslim world. It clearly represents an evolution between Muslim lines and can constitute a model of stability. The Iranian Islamist view of the state, form of government and its continuous improvement in the light of Mahdism teaching, its vision towards private property, society and economy has made it not only an Islamist model but also of model of stability , a uniquely brand of Islamic democracy.
The Iranian revolution was a series of spontaneous, sometimes not organized demonstrations that begun at the end of 1970’s, that culminated in January 1979 when its leader, Imam Khomeini returned to Iran from his French exile. From 1979 to the present days, passing through different phases, the revolution succeeded not only staying in power but through it, Iran, met a true milestone and an unparallel degree of institutional maturity. Following the end of the Pahlavi monarchy, the revolutionaries opted as expected for the republican form of government. Since Islam had been the prime vehicle of revolution in opposing Pahlavian monarchy, religion was inevitably playing a major role in post revolutionary system. On March 30 and 31 1979 Iranians were asked through a historical referendum if they thought Iran should be an Islamic Republic. 98.2 percent responded affirmatively. As a result, in the aftermath of the referendum, Iran became an Islamic Republic.
Throughout its existence as an Islamic Republic, Iran passed from a radical post revolutionary form to a relatively moderate and reconstruction period. Iran opened up to the world and began to give substance to the modern Islamic Republic. The end of the 1990’s, has marked the beginning of the Third Republic that appeared to be far clearer in its vision of the future and the means available to achieve it. Through progress and modernity, up to present days, The Islamic Republic of Iran was taken to a more and more developed stage, a stage where internal politics will be entirely supported by civil society and where foreign policy will argue for a dialogue of civilizations.
The respect for the rule of law, the restoration of the civil society, the greater normality of political life, the less intrusive state and the more persuasive social and cultural environment, transformed Iran in a model of stability in the region. After years of fear and silence, intellectuals and academics had finally the liberty to debate and discuss on political topics as social identity, postmodernism, civil society, political accountability, representative democracy, democratic governance in Islam, the essence of society and the status of women.
Lately, Iranian society managed to initiate a dialog on key topics that is needed to enhance the country’s larger sense of identity, the nature of the relationship between religion and politics and the appropriateness of concepts such as the Faqih.
The progressiveness of Iran shows not only that Islam caries within it the seeds of renewal and progress, but that Shiaism could be catalogued as a revolution between revolutionary lines. Scholars as well as intellectuals of Shiaism are progressive, pointing toward the ideal of society in the Muslim world. While other Islamic scholars have preached from the beginning of Islam for submission and acceptance to rulers even though they were corrupt and oppressive, the Shiaism preached resistance against them and denounced them as illegitimate, as Imam Khomeini beautifully said it. The Shiaism had always opposed oppressive and illegitimate governments. In comparison to the Sunnis, that states that oppressing government contradicts to Islam’s teachings, Shiaism had always a mind of their own. The examples throughout history are abundant. Shiaism only accepts as legitimate the rule of Imams and the one they appoint as holders of authority.
In addition to other concepts found in Middle Eastern society, the Iranian model constitutes a step foreword to what Islamism means. However, what is it that makes Iran so unique? There are two elements that contribute to this uniqueness and that can set Iran in being a model of internal stability and societal wellness. First is ijtihad, the fight for truth. In the way of ijtihad, the jurist must work intellectually to determine the details of God’s divine commands. The goal is not to set laws, but to understand and acknowledge an already present law. Why is it that this principle, common in the Muslim society, both Sunni and Shia, is considered such a breakthrough for the Islamic Republic of Iran? It is for the Shia in comparison to the Sunni that do not consider ijtihad as a closed gateway. The ijtihad is vivid in the Shia world and in Iran, it contributed to the modernization of society and law. It reshaped Muslim society in a modern matter. For Shia jurisprudence, the intellectual and hermeneutical flexibility of the Ulama gave them an ascendant to their Sunni counterpart, permitting to modernize the entire society in an Islamic matter, allowing them to surpass the Islamic Golden Age, and to prepare for the awaited day of the appearing of the Mahdi.
The second is velayat-e-faqih, the Khomeini view over government, who said that government should be left in the hands of the high hierarchy clerics. This concept of velayat-e-faqih (jurist\'s guardianship), was predominantly apolitical. Clerics were to “study the law based on the Koran, the Prophet\'s traditions, and the teachings of the Twelve Imams. They were also to use reason to update these laws; issue pronouncements on new problems; adjudicate in legal disputes; and distribute the khoms contributions to worthy widows, orphans, seminary students, and indigent male descendants of the Prophet. In fact, for most the term velayat-e-faqih meant no more than the legal guardianship of the senior clerics over those deemed incapable of looking after their own interests — minors, widows, and the insane.” For some, velayat-e-faqih also meant that the senior clerics had the right to enter the political fray temporarily, when the monarch clearly endangered the whole community.
Khomeini exposed various reasons why the fuqaha, (religious judgments) had the divine right to rule. He differentiated between the religious judges and the other members of the senior clergy who were specialized in other subjects. He said, interpreting a quranic commandment that Muslims had to follow their religious judges. “The Prophet had handed down to the Imams all-encompassing authority the right to lead and supervise the community as well as to interpret and implement the sacred law. The Twelfth Imam, by going into hiding, had passed on this all-encompassing authority to the religious judges. Had not Imam Ali ordered "all believers to obey his successors"? Had he not explained that by "successors" he meant "those who transmit my statements and my traditions and teach them to the people"? Had not the Seventh Imam praised the religious judges as "the fortress of Islam"? Had not the Twelfth Imam instructed future generations to obey those who knew his teachings since they were his representatives among the people in the same way as he was God\'s representative among all believers? Had not the Prophet himself declared that knowledge led to paradise and that "men of knowledge" had as much superiority over ordinary mortals as the full moon had over the stars? Had not God created the sacred law to guide the community, the state to implement the sacred law, and the religious judges to understand and implement the sacred law?”
He therefore concluded religious judges, had the "same authority" as the Prophet and the imams; and the term velayat-e-faqih meant jurisdiction over believers. “In other words, disobedience to the religious judges was disobedience to God. “

Khomeini told his listeners that "true Islam" might appear "strange" to them, as the pre-existing false ideas and continuous misinterpretation.
The concept velayat-e-faqih reappeared in the Iranian Islamic Constitution. Described as the Supreme Religious Jurist, it was given the authority to dismiss the president, appoint the main military commanders, declare war and peace, and name senior clerics to the Guardian Council, whose chief responsibility was to ensure that all laws passed by Parliament conformed to the sacred law.
This two-stage electoral process was meant to help harmonize the concepts of divine rule and clerical supervision with those of popular sovereignty and majority representation. It involved the notion of a "social contract" between the religious judges and the population.
The clergy was theoretically divided into two distinct groups: those most knowledgeable about religious scholarship, including the sacred law, and those most knowledgeable about the contemporary world, especially economic, social, and political matters. The latter was chosen to rule because they were more in touch with the "problems of the day."
The two concepts make Iran a special model of government as well as a break true of Islamic fundamentalism, as the other two models of Islamism states Afghanistan and Sudan never had that ability in working as a light. They never had the institutions of a state, resembling more to war or occupation administrations and could never accomplish the power of central government and the stability that characterizes the Iranian modern state.

Conclusion
In the lights of Mahdism teachings Shia’ Muslims have to fight to the improvement of the world, to bring it closer to that model of perfect society that should bring peace to the world, to prepare the world for the coming of the Mahdi. In this perspective, the Iranian Republic has evolved greatly, and became more and more of a progressive and stable society based on equality, justice and truth. This is just the beginning, but its forms and means will progress hopefully continuously.
The awaiting of the Mahdi return is an inspiration to Shia Iran to think its policy more optimistic, to believe in a better future of humanity, and to help to its construction. The awaited victory of right, virtue, peace, justice, freedom and truth over forces of evil in all its forms, motivates continuously Iranian society and will help to its every day improvement.
Mahdism argues about just government with equal distribution of wealth and property among men, eradication of vices, war and restoration of peace, good governance, friendship cooperation and benevolence. These are all constructive expectations that manifest lately in Iranian policy.
We cannot know how the world would look like in the future, and no one can predict to the future of the Middle East. Where western solutions have proved to be wrong, the solution is now due to come from Islam. In this sense, The Islamic Republic constitutes a model for the region. In time, Muslim societies would perhaps import the Iranian revolution. Perhaps the Muslim nations will find their own way. Meantime Iran should progress on its path and inspire nations in the Middle East. One thing is certain. Without the continuous fight towards improvement, the Iranian society would not be what it is today, and in this perspective, the role played by the Mahdism Doctrine should be stressed out.



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