"And I am to the Messenger of God like a tree to another tree coming from one trunk and I am to him like a lower arm to the upper arm. By God if all the Arabs combine their efforts in combating me I would not turn my back to them . . . And I shall endeavor to purify the earth from this inverted person until the soil is separated from the grain."( 1 )
"By God if I confront them while they are filling the land I would not be concerned; nor would I feel lonely. I am with assurance from myself and certainty from my Lord through which I see the falsehoods to which my opponents adhere and the guidance which I follow. I am expecting to meet my Lord and hoping for His reward. I am saddened to expect the affairs of this nation to be administered by its wicked foes. They shall distribute the revenue of God among themselves and enslave His servants. They shall oppress the righteous and befriend the transgressors." (the Imam Ali) ( 2)
Had Ali Ibn Abu Talib been a politician whose main
concern was to come to power and enjoy authority un-
concerned with what will happen to the future genera-
tions he could have easily gained Muaweyah's support by
( 1 ) The Imam Ali Nahjul-Balaghah part 3 p.73.
( 2 ) The Imam Ali Nahjul-Balaghah part 3 p.120.
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keeping him as governor of Syria and promising him to be his successor. This would have relieved the Imam from combating him and would have secured his loyalty and assistance.
Men who are in love with authority are always ready to pay the price regardless of its magnitude because authority to them is more valuable than any price they pay. Our Imam was not from these Authority by itself did not have in his view any vale.
Therefore he was not ready to pay for the authority a price which he considered more valuable than the authority. History witnessed the Imam Ali losing the caliphate when it was offered to him at the conclusion of the Electoral Convention because he refused to pay its price. The price which he refused to pay was not more than one word by which he promises Abdul-Rahman Ibn Ouf to follow the first two Caliphs in matters where he finds no instruction from the Holy Qur'an or the precepts of the Holy Prophet. ( 3 He refused to pay for the caliphate that small price because he believed that he was more knowledgeable in the Islamic Law than the two outstanding companions.
He believed also that their precepts were marred by errors which he did not legalize for himself to follow.
As he refused to offer for the leadership a promise to follow the ways of two brilliant companions he would not be expected to grant Muaweyah the man of a terrible past what he seeks in order to enjoy a peaceful leadership.
The Imam was not a conventional politician whose main concern is to come to power. He was rather a unique statesman. Had not Ali Ibn Abu Talib existed the Islamic ideals after the Messenger would have remained subjective without being embodied completely in a human being.
Security for all Muslim generations against religious deviation was the goal which the Imam was trying to accomplish through leadership. That goal could be summarized as follows: 1. To make justice prevalent in society regardless of
( 3 ) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.37.
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the religious elements from which it may be composed and retrieving for the nation and individuals what was acquired by the elites through exploitations.
2. To enforce Islamic law so that the adherence to the Islamic principles becomes second nature to the Muslims individually and collectively.
3. To facilitate understanding of the Holy Qur'an and instructions of the Prophet for the followers of the Faith of Islam.
4. To try to spread Islam throughout the world by making the true Islamic teaching known to all nations.
In other words the Imam wanted to realize what the Holy Prophet wanted when he tried to dictate a document for his nation that his nation will never stray after it. The political circumstances of the nation had led the nation to deviate from the safe road in the past. Finally the Imam who represented in the eyes of the Messenger the security for the nation against deviation has come to power. His duty is to realize that security for the nation and this was within his reach if the nation obeys him. He is the most knowledgeable in the Book of God and the teachings of the Holy Prophet. He was the most concerned person with spreading the teaching of the Faith of Islam and the spirit of adherence to that teaching. He by the testimony of the Messenger and the outstanding companions is the most qualified to direct the nation to the right and clear road after the Messenger. He was after the Prophet the bravest and firmest person who ever walked on earth.
The Imam believed that retaining Muaweyah within his regime contradicts what he was trying to accomplish.
Muaweyah by his nature was opportunist exploiter materialistic and unprincipled. With his wiliness and power Muaweyah was the most dangerous among the opportunists. The Imam was right when he thought that retaining Muaweyah in the rule of Syria will enable him to rule the Muslim world. And this was not all the danger.
The bigger danger was the expected continuity of the leadership in the house of Omayad and rotation of the caliphate in their dynasty.
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The Omayad period proved later that the Imam was right in his thinking. The rule of Muaweyah and the rest of the Omayads was the antithesis of the Imam's goal. It represented the usurpation of the people's right their exploitation shedding the blood of the innocent and the defiance of the Islamic Laws. This resulted with the weaken ing of the Islamic Spirit in the successive generations.
The war of Siffeen the assassination of Hijr Ibn Oday and his righteous companions for their refusal to repudiate the religion of Ali the massacre of Karbala and the defamation of the Imam on the pulpits of the Muslim World for eighty-three years were some of the traits of the Omayad anti-Islam rule.
MUGHEERAH AND IBN ABBAS
History recorded that Mugheerah Ibn Shu-abah Al- Thaqafi came to the Imam after he was elected and advised him to keep Muaweyah in his office at least temporarily. The Imam refused his advice. On the following day Mugheerah came to the Imam admitting that he was mistaken and advised the Imam to dismiss Muaweyah. Ibn Abbas witnessed Mugheerah coming out of the house of the Imam while he himself was about to enter the house of the Imam. When Ibn Abbas met the Imam he asked him about Mugheerah's visit. The Imam informed him of Mugheerah's two contradictory opinions. Ibn Abbas commented that Mugheerah was genuine in his first advice deceptive in his second advice. He affirmed that the wise policy is to keep Muaweyah in his post at least temporarily and it would be easy for the Imam to dismiss him after he joins his electors. The Imam refused to retain Muaweyah in his post because he did not want to deviate from his principles which do not permit him to keep Muaweyah in his post for two days. ( 4)
It appeared to many past and present historians that what Ibn Abbas and Mugheerah counseled the Imam to do
( 4 ) Ibn Al-Atheer, Al-Kamil, part 3, p.101.
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4. IBn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.101.
was right. Had the Imam accepted their advice he would not have had to wage the war of Siffeen and he could have dismissed Muaweyah later and the reign of the Imam could have been peaceful instead of being filled with civil wars.
Naive Opinion
I believe that those who hold this opinion were not able to estimate the fore-sightedness of the Imam and his awareness of Muaweyah's intention. At the same time they underestimated the wiliness of Muaweyah and his alertness. Ibn Abbas and Mugheerah both were mistaken.
The Imam had seen through the light of God and his super mental capability years before he was elected that the Omayads will come to power and that they will rotate the leadership among them. He spoke of that during the days of the Electoral Convention before Othman was elected. At that time he said to his uncle Abbas. "I know that they will elect Othman and if he is assassinated or dies the children of Omayad will rotate the caliphate among them; and if I am alive they will find me where they dislike." ( 5)
The Progress of the events indicated to the people of
wisdom and understanding that the Omayads were going
to come to power. Omar appointed Muaweyah as gover-
nor of Damascus then he widened his authority by adding
Jordan to Damascus. He kept him in that post for the
duration of his reign. This made Muaweyah so strong that
the Caliph after he was stabbed warned the members of
the Electoral Convention not to dispute with each other;
otherwise Muaweyah may prevail against them and take
the leadership away from them. Should such a word reach
Muaweyah it would inflame his ambition towards the
caliphate and make him expect the day when he becomes
( 5 ) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.36.
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Al-Tabari also reported this in his History part 4 p.230.
able to snatch the leadership from the hands of the outstanding companions.
Muaweyah's Long Preparation
Muaweyah realized that he could not come to power through a natural course. The caliphate in the eyes of the Muslims was only for the outstanding companions who adopted the faith of Islam at the early stage and offered many sacrifices during the days of the Prophethood when the faith of Islam was at its primary stage of spreading.
Muaweyah was not one of those people. As a matter of fact Muaweyah and Abu Sufyan the father of Muaweyah and the majority of the Omayads except Othman Abu Huthifa and Khalid Ibn Al-Auss were the front line of the enemies of the Messenger. They were waging against him and his religion war after war trying to eliminate Islam and its Messenger. They refused to adopt Islam until the Messenger conquered Meccab and Islam became their only means for saving their lives.( 6 )
For the Muslims to move the caliphate from the early
companions of the Holy Prophet to the enemy of the
prophet they had to reverse themselves insanely
or the enemies of the Messenger would reach the caliphate by
force. Muaweyah was not nearer to the caliphate than his
father Abu Sufyan. However time was not ungenerous to
the son of Abu Sufyan with opportunities. Othman came
to power and his caliphate revived the hopes of the
Omayads and made them nearer to their dreams. Othman
as we mentioned (in chapter 21) through the two sides of
his personality represented a potential bridge through
which the caliphate may cross from the early righteous
companions of the Holy Prophet to the Omayads the
people of the dark past. Othman was from the early
companions. At the same time he was an Omayad and he
loved his cousins a great deal. His love for them would
cause him to move the caliphate to one of his op-
( 6 ) Taha Hussein Al-Fitnat Al-Kubrah part 2 p. 14.
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portunist cousins and they would use him for reaching their goals.
The wily Abu Sufyan realized that as soon as Othman was elected. He said to the members of the Omayad clan while they were meeting at the house of the new Caliph:
"Make the caliphate alternate among you. By the one in whose name Abu Sufyan swears there is no Paradise and no Hell. . ." ( 7 )
It is possible that the new Caliph was not present when Abu Sufyan uttered that profane statement or that the Caliph admonished and chided him but these words actually expressed the thinking of the Omayads and what they were trying to reach.
The caliphate of Othman added to the power of Muaweyah a much greater power than he had during the time of the Second Caliph. The area of his rule and influence was greatly widened to include Palestine Hums and Qinnisreen. ( 8 ) Thus he became the governor of what may be called "The Greater Syria." It is true that the authority of Muaweyah was growing during the days of Omar but it was under strong supervision of the Second Caliph. When Othman took over the authority of Muaweyah was freed of all supervision and by widening the area of his influence Muaweyah emerged as the most powerful ruler in the Muslim World. He became stronger than the Caliph.
The Caliph began to resort to him in punishing his opponents in Hijaz and Iraq by sending them to Syria and putting them under the supervision of the strong man of the Muslim State. ( 8a)
Muaweyah was not the man who neglects opportuni-
ties. He was the kind of person who seizes every op-
portunity and gets out of it the utmost benefits. He started
to establish his rule and lay the foundation of his future
since the days of Omar. He went on attracting the chiefs
( 7 ) Ibn Abu Al-Hadeed his Commentary on Nahjul-Balaghah vol 2 p. 411.
( 8 ) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p. 57.
( 8a ) Dr. Taha Hussein Al-Fitnat Al-Kubrah part 2 pp. 118-119 .
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of the tribes through his generous gifts and mobilizing whomever he was able to mobilize until he possessed the strongest striking force in the Muslim World. One hundred thousand supported by an equal number from their sons and servants were paid annually from the Islamic treasury in Syria. ( 9 )
Muaweyah found in Othman his means to the caliphate. He was his cousin and his beloved. It was very likely that Othman would appoint him as his successor if peace continued during the reign of Othman. When the situation changed and the political atmosphere became grim showing that the signs of violence evil and tragedy were creeping near the Caliph Muaweyah wanted to make out of the difficulties of the Caliph a means which would bring him quickly to his goal.
Muaweyah Refused to Protect Othman
Muaweyah invited Othman when the danger surrounded him to move to Damascus ostensibly for the purpose of shielding the Caliph against danger. (10) His actual motive was to put the Caliph under his protection. Thus Othman would keep the name of the caliphate and Muaweyah would be the actual caliph and at the end Othman will appoint Muaweyah his successor.
The Caliph did hot respond to the invitation. Mua-
weyah however was capable of preventing the tragedy
from reaching the Caliph by sending an army to Medina in
order to defend the Caliph. He did not do that though the
Caliph asked for his military assistance.(11) Muaweyah
chose to hand his cousin to the knife of the revolution. He
refused to assist him militarily. (12) He thought rightly
that Othman's death would give him a pretext to seek avenge
for the blood of the victim Caliph. By this he would excite
( 9 ) Abdul-Fattah Abdul-Maqsoud Al-Imam Ali Abu Talib part 2 p. 120.
(10) Taha Hussein Al-Fitnat Al-Kubrah part 2 p. 57.
(11) Taha Hussein Al-Fitnat Al-Kubrah part 2 p. 59.
(12) Taha Hussein Al-Fitnat Al-Kubrah part 2 p. 59.
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the masses of the people and take them out of their sound thinking and transfer the Muslim World to an insane situation which brings Muaweyah to what he wanted.
Forecast Rule
In addition to the helpful opportunities and the continuous preparations which made Muaweyah close to his goal he heard many prophecies supporting his thinking and made his wish to reach the caliphate strong and full of life.
Ibn Al-Atheer recorded that while Othman was coming back from pilgrimage accompanying Muaweyah who was riding a blond mule a man uttered some poetry indicating that the successor of Othman would be Ali then Al- Zubeir. But Kaab Al-Ahbar (a Rabbi who adopted Islam) said to the poet: You have lied. The one who will succeed the Caliph is the rider of the blond mule. (13) Muaweyah became ambitious since that time.
The fact is that his ambition did not start at that time.
Muaweyah heard similar to this from the person who was much truer than Kaab Al-Ahbar. I do not believe that Kaab Al-Ahbar found the caliphate of Muaweyah in the Jewish books as he tried to pretend. He actually found that through statements of some companions who heard from the Holy Prophet (one of them was Abu Tharr) who was known for his truth and to this the Holy Prophet had testified. ( 14 Abu Othman Al-Jahith in his book Al-Safyaneyah recorded that Jallam Ibn Jandal Al-Ghifari attended a dialogue between Muaweyah and Abu Tharr after Othman exiled Abu Tharr to Damascus. Muaweyah said to Abu Tharr: "Enemy of God and enemy of His Messenger you come every day and do what you are doing. If I were to kill a man from the companions of Mohammad without the permission of the Caliph Othman I would have killed you.".
(13) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.73.
(14) Al-Termathi his authentic Sunan part 5 p.334.
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Abu Tharr retorted saying to Muawayah: "I am not the enemy of God and His Messenger. You and your father are the enemies of God and His Messenger. You showed Islam and concealed disbelief. The Holy Messenger cursed you and prayed to God that you will never be cured of hunger. I heard the Messenger of God saying:
"When the big eyed with the broad throat the one who eats and never gets full becomes the ruler of this nation the nation should be alarmed." Muaweyah said: "I am not that man." Abu Tharr said: "Yes you are that man.
The Messenger of God informed me of that and I heard him saying while you were passing: God curse him and make him not feel full except by soil . . ." ( 15 )
Abu Tharr reported in the presence of Othman that the Messenger of God said: "When the children of Abu Al- Auss (the clan of Marwan from the Omayads) become thirty men they will distribute the revenue of God among themselves and enslave the servants of God and interpolate the religion of God. ( 16)
Omar said to Mugheerah Ibn Shu-abah (and this man was one eyed): "By God the Omayads will make Islam one eyed as you are one eyed and they will blind it until Islam is unable to know where to go and where to come.(17)
Omar also reported that he heard from the Messenger of God the following: "The children of Omayad will ascend to my pulpit. I was shown them in my dream jumping on it like monkeys. About them the revelation came 'And We did not make the vision which you have seen but a trial to people and the cursed tree in the Holy Qur'an . . .'"(18)
Fakhr Al-Deen Al-Razi in his commentary on this
verse recorded that Sa-eed Ibn Al-Musayab said: "The
(15) Ibn Abu Al-Hadeed his Commentary on Nahjul-Balaghah vol.2 p.376.
(16) Ibn Abu Al-Hadeed Commentary on Nahjul-Balaghah vol.2 p.377.
(17) Ibn Abu Al-Hadeed Commentary on Nahjul-Balaghah vol.2 p.115.
(18) Ibn Abu Al-Hadeed Commentary on Nahjul-Balaghah vol.2 p.115.
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Messenger of God saw in his dream the children of Omayad jumping on his pulpit like monkeys and that saddened him." Al-Razi said: "This is the opinion of Ibn Abbas according to the hadith of Ata." ( 19 ) He reported also that Ibn Abbas said that the cursed tree is Banu Omayad meaning Al-Hakam Ibn Abu Al-Auss. Ibn Abbas said: "The Messenger of God saw in his dream that the children of Marwan were alternating on his pulpit and he informed Abu Bakr and Omar of his dream while they were with him at his house. When they left the Messenger of God heard Al-Hakam speaking of the dream of the Messenger.
The Holy Prophet became angry and suspected that Omar betrayed his secret. Then it appeared later that Al-Hakam was spying on them. The Prophet exiled him... "(20)
Al-Hakim reported that Imam Al-Hassan Ibn Ali said to a man from his companions: "Blame me not (for abdicating the caliphate); may God have His Mercy upon you. The Messenger of God saw in his dream the children of Omayad speaking on his pulpit one after the other. This saddened him and it was revealed to him in the chapter of Glory:
"We have revealed it (The Qur'an) during the Night of Glory and what did make you know the Night of Glory. The Night of Glory is better than a thousand months (in which the children of Omayads rule the nation." ( 21)
From all this we may understand the meaning of the word of the Imam to his uncle during the days of the Electoral Convention: "I know that they will elect Othman. . .
if he is killed or he dies the children of Omayad will alternate it among them . . ." (22) No doubt the Imam heard from the Messenger concerning Othman and the Omayads
(19) Imam Fakhr Al-Razi his Detailed Commentary on The Holy Qur'an part 5 pp.413-414.
(20) Imam Fakhr Al-Razi his Detailed Commentary on The Holy Qur'an part 5 pp.413-414.
(21) Al-Hakim Al-Mustadrak part 3 p.171.
(22) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.230.
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in general and Muaweyah in particular more than Omar Abu Tharr and others heard from the Prophet about them.
The Imam said after the Battle of Bassrah when Marwan was brought to him to renew his pledge of allegiance to the Imam: "What shall I do with his pledge? Did he not pledge in Medina? If he pledges his loyalty to me by his hand he will betray it by his back." When Marwan left the Imam said: "He will have a rule as short as a dog's licking its nose. He is the father of the four Rams. The nation will have through him and his children a bloody day." (23)
Thus Muaweyah had prepared himself eighteen years for his goal. He seized every opportunity and acquired out of it its utmost benefits and heard what was conveyed to him of the prophecies of the Holy Prophet concerning the Omayads and concerning him. It was only naive on the part of Ibn Abbas or others to think that keeping Muaweyah in his post temporarily would give the Imam the opportunity to dismiss him easily without a bloody war.
Ali would not have attempted to deceive Muaweyah and if he wanted to do that he would not have succeeded.
Muaweyah was too wily to be disuaded of his goal. Had the Imam Ali followed the advice of Ibn Abbas and Mugheerah the Imam would have deceived only himself.
I believe that the two advisors with all their intelligence and wiliness had underestimated the knowledge of the Imam about Muaweyah and the Imam's wisdom and his farsightedness as they underestimated the wiliness of Muaweyah and his determination. Historians who shared Ibn Abbas and Mugheerah's opinion committed the same mistake.
The Imam could have earned peace with Muaweyah by keeping him in his position for the duration of his life and appointing him his successor. But if the Imam had done that he would have acquired a personal gain at the expense of everything he had stood for. He was fully aware
(23) Al-Imam Ali Nahjul-Balaghah part 1 p.124.
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that Muaweyah could not be trusted with the religion of God and the Islamic nation. The Imam said one time. "I have thought about alternatives concerning Muaweyah. I found only two of them: either to fight him or to reject what was revealed to Mohammad." ( 24)
WAS OMAYAD'S RULE INEVITABLE?
It may be said that if the Holy Prophet had informed his nation that the Omayads will come to power why did the Imam fight Muaweyah while he knew that Muaweyah would prevail? What is the benefit of shedding blood if the consequence which the Imam wanted to avoid was the same consequence which God had predetermined for him?
The fact is that the Prophet did not inform Ali or the rest of the companions that the rule of the Omayads was inevitable and predestined from Heaven and that the will of man has no value in that affair. Actually the opposite is true. The Holy Messenger wanted to inform his nation that its failure to protect Islam against the Omayads' conspiracy shall bring the Omayads to power and make them rule the nation. This was a warning from the Messenger to his nation aimed at advising the nation to take the necessary measures to prevent this from happening.
The Holy Prophet prescribed to the nation the measures which shield the nation against this danger and all dangers of deviations.
The prescribed measures were the adherence to the Holy Qur'an and the leadership of the members of the House of the Prophet. He said to the nation that this represents the security against deviation. Had the nation followed the prescription of the Prophet the Omayads could not have come to power and the nation would have been secured against any faith-testing crises.
It was unfortunate that the nation did not heed the Messenger's warnings and did not take the steps which he
(24) Al-Imam Ali Nahjul-Balaghah part 1 p.94.
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prescribed. The nation actually disregarded the second part of the advice completely. It took the opposite road which led the nation into what the Messenger warned against.
The Imam was the only leader who wanted to shield the nation against the danger of the Omayads. Had Omar done the least in this field he could have prevented that danger. The Imam Ali was required to wage a bloody war against Muaweyah in order to protect the nation against his danger. The Second Caliph could have shielded the nation against Muaweyah's danger by avoiding his appointment or dismissing him after he appointed him or selecting Ali instead of Othman who came to power through the arrangement of the Electoral Convention. This is what brought the Omayads to power.
I would like to add that all these events did not constitute a determining factor in preventing the Imam from subduing Muaweyah and reaching a peaceful reign. Even after all these events took place it was possible for the Imam to rid the nation of Muaweyah and to subdue him or dismiss him. Had "Om Al-Mu'mineen" (Ayeshah) and the two outstanding companions Talhah and Al-Zubeir co-operated with the Imam and urged the Muslims to help him instead of revolting against him Muaweyah would have surrendered to the Imam with humility. Had the three leaders done that instead of starting the fire of rebellion the rule of the Imam would have been stabilized and the Muslims would have been spared all the civil wars which were inflamed during the first century after the death of the Prophet. Unfortunately the three leaders took the opposite road and led the nation into what the Messenger warned against.
The Battle of Bassrah made peace with Muaweyah un-
available to the Imam as it made the war with Muaweyah
inevitable unless the Imam denies all his principles. The
Battle of Bassrah made it clear to Muaweyah that he was
not the only one who was opposed to the Imam and that
people outside Syria shared with him his opinion and
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legalized war against Ali and that they did not see it wrong to shed blood for the sake of his opposition.
The Battle itself created to the Imam enemies who were silenced temporarily by his victory but they were ready to rejoin his enemies as soon as the opportunity permitted.
This opportunity came after that and they rushed into it.
The Battle of Siffeen was truly inevitable. Yet it was not Heavenly predestined because man's will had played a very important role. Had the Iraqi people listened to the Imam and followed him to the end of the road it would not have been necessary for the nation to surrender to the authority of the Omayads and they would have spared the future generations many terrible evils.
Thus the authority of the Omayads in spite of being predicted by the Holy Prophet was not a Heavenly predestined event. It was only a result of the refusal of the nation to take the right medicine which was prescribed by the Holy Prophet. Certainly the nation continued to refuse it until the end.
I would like to add that the Imam was duty-bound to take the road which he chose even if the Omayad authority were predestined. The position of the Imam was like the position of many prophets who endeavored in the way of God and died in their endeavor without reaching their aim of making the word of God triumphant. I do not believe that the Prophet Mohammad would have discontinued his endeavor if he had known that he would not win his struggle against his pagan enemies. Had he known that he would have entered and continued the battle of truth to its end. This is what he declared to his uncle Abu Talib:
"Uncle by God if they put the Sun in my right hand and the Moon in my left hand to abandon this mission I will not abandon it until God makes it triumphant or I perish in it.".
The war which the Imam waged was a preventive
measure against the Omayad danger. It was an imperative
duty rested upon his shoulders after he found supporters
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for his message and mission ready to sacrifice. Had he not done that he would have been negligent in discharging the trust and he would have been an accomplice in the injustice deviation and sins of the Omayads.
Did the Imam Exercise His Rule as a Preacher?
Some of the students of history think that one of the main reasons for the difficulties which the Imam encountered in his caliphate is that he did not exercise his rule as a ruler. He rather exercised his rule as a preacher. He was not firm with his opponents. He allowed them to oppose him and he was so lenient with them that they felt safe to confront him and disobey him.
Abdullah Ibn Omar and Saad Ibn Abu Waqass and others from the companions in Medina refused to elect him and he did not force them to change their vote as the Caliphs before him did. None of the three Caliphs allowed any companions to refrain from giving their allegiance to the Caliph. Al-Zubeir was forced to give his allegiance to Abu Bakr and Abu Bakr and his minister Omar applied a tremendous pressure on Ali himself to give his allegiance to Abu Bakr.
When Al-Zubeir and Talhah left Medina to Mecca pre-
tending that they were going for Omrah (a mini pilgrim-
age) to visit the House of God the Imam knew that they
were going to join the rebellious group in Mecca. ( 1 ) In spite
of knowing that he did not prevent the two companions
from leaving Medina. It would have been wise on his part
to jail the two companions until the situation became
( 1 ) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.491 and p.444.
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clear. Had he done that he would have spared himself and the Muslims many difficulties and sacrifices.
When he came back to Kufa after the battle of Siffeen he should have punished Ashaath after he witnessed a great deal of evidence indicating the insincerity of Ashaath and his co-operation with his enemies. He did not do that and surrendered to Ashaath's pressure time after time. He postponed the return to the Battle of Siffeen and entered into the Battle of Nahrawan under Ashaath's pressure.
It would have been wise to keep Ashaath outside the battlefield from the beginning. When the Imam was elected Ashaath was still in his post in Persia as one of Othman's appointees. When the Imam was about to leave to Siffeen he dismissed Ashaath from his post. He according to some reports required Ashaath to pay some of the funds which he took from the public treasury then he accompanied him after he reformed him. Had Ashaath been left in his post the fanatic readers (of the Holy Qur'an) who called for acceptance of the arbitration would not have been able to impose arbitration.
A Winner of Three Wars Is Not Unfirm
It is absurd to say that the Imam did not exercise his rule as a ruler or that he exercised his rule as a preacher and that he did not seriously attempt to keep his authority after he obtained it. It is absurd to say that when we know that the Imam waged three wars against his opponents and defeated them completely at Bassrah annihilated his opponents at Nahrawan and confronted and almost crushed Muaweyah and his army at the biggest battle the history of Islam ever witnessed until that day. A ruler who treated his enemies with such firmness should not be accused of practicing his rule as a preacher.
Why Did He Not Force Some Companions to Elect Him?
It is true that the Imam did not force Ibn Omar Saad Ibn Abu Waqaas and a number of companions to pledge their allegiance to him and allowed them to take a neutral
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position. But this is what the Islamic justice demands. It is not permissible for any elective government to force individuals to elect it. Election means authorization by choice. Thus pledging loyalty by force is the opposite of election. Therefore Islam declares that allegiance taken by force is forbidden and unbinding. It is one of the natural rights which the faith of Islam sanctifies that every human being has the right to exercise his political freedom and this is what the most advanced governments in this century sanctify.
When Al-Zubeir was forced to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr Ali considered such a coercion contrary to the principle of justice. Individuals and minorities have the right to disagree with the majority and the majority does not have the right to pressure the minority unless the minority attempts to prevent the majority from exercising its administration. Should a minority try to prevent the majority from administering the affairs of the nation the majority would be duty-bound to subdue the minority when the election is sound. Saad and Ibn Omar and others did not try to prevent the Imam from exercising his rule as a caliph.
Why Did the Imam Not Prevent Talhah and Al-Zubeir from Leaving Medina?
The Imam did not prevent the two companions from leaving Medina though he knew that they were going to declare an armed rebellion against him and he was right in doing that. It was not in the interest of the Imam to be accused of preventing two outstanding companions from offering a devotional visit to the House of God or to jail them for attempting to do that.
Ayeshah was ready to tell that to the Muslim World and to use such an action on the part of the Imam as an additional excuse for revolting against him.
Furthermore keeping the two companions in Medina would not prevent the Mother of Believers from starting a revolt against the Imam. Ayeshah was ready to start that
( 480 )
revolt with or without the two companions. She started her rebellion as soon as she received the news of the Imam's election and without knowing the attitude of the two companions toward him.( 2 ) She had a large amount of funds and a good number of men to do that. The Omayads and their followers were at her disposal and anxious to cooperate with her. ( 3 )
Why Did He Not Continue the War in Siffeen?
It is not fair to criticize the Imam for the discontinuation of the battle after the copies of the Holy Qur'an were hoisted. Had the majority of his army remained healthy and obedient to him such a criticism would have been justifiable. He could have been blamed if he had been among those who were deceived by the hoisting of the copies of the Holy Qur'an. But the Imam was the first to tell his army: "Go on with all your determination to fight your enemy." He declared to them that hoisting the Holy Qur'an is only a deception and conspiracy. Muaweyah and his supporters wanted to avoid a crushing defeat. He told them that he knew the leaders of the opposite camp as men and as children and they were the worst children and the worst men. They were not people of religion or Qur'an. ( 4 )
He told them all that but they were already deceived and they were unable to see the truth. They defied him and threatened to do to him what they did to Othman or to take him as a captive and deliver him to Muaweyah. When they did that no voice in the army with which he was surrounded was raised against them. Thus the Imam was forced to withdraw Al-Ashtar and his division. ( 5 )
Had the Imam continued the war a battle among elements
of his army would have started instead of a battle
between them and the enemy. As a matter of fact that
( 2 ) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p. 459.
( 3 ) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p. 106.
( 4 ), ( 5 ), ( 6 ) Al-Tabari his History part 5 pp. 48-49.
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battle was about to start between Al-Ashtar and the people of anti-war movement. He cursed them and they cursed him and they hit with their rods the face of his horse and he hit with his rod the faces of their horses but the lmam stopped their arguments. ( 6)
Had such a battle started among the elements of the Imam's army it would have ended with a hastened catastrophe in which thousands of them would have perished. The hostility among the survivors of the expected battle would have been inflamed leaving no room for reuniting them to fight the enemy again.
Had the Imam insisted on continuing the war and refused to withdraw Al-Ashtar and his division from the battle all evidence indicated that the fanatics who surrounded the Imam were ready to assassinate him or hand him to Muaweyah. This could have happened without the knowledge of Al-Ashtar and his division. Had the Imam been killed at that time or at a battle that would have started afterwards between the two elements of his companions the catastrophe would have been much greater than we could imagine.
Why Did He Not Punish Ashaath?
I do not see any logical justification for criticizing the Imam because he accompanied Ashaath to Siffeen or because he did not punish him when his insincerity and collaboration with the enemy became evident. The Imam is a human being. He cannot know the future nor would he be able to foresee that Ashaath would conspire against him if he were in the army. To keep Ashaath away from the battlefield would not prevent the crisis of the arbitration. The Seceders who were the main factor in the crisis were not from the followers of Ashaath. Thousands and thousands of fighters shared with the readers of the Qur'an their opinion believing that turning down the invitation of the arbitration was a major sin. Ashaath was not the only hypocrite among the followers of the Imam.
( 482 )
The Imam did not punish Ashaath after his insincerity became evident for two reasons: 1. Ashaath was an intelligent hypocrite. He was able to cover up his hypocrisy showing no evidence that would prove his conspiracy. There was at the time of the Messenger many hypocrites who declared Islam prayed and fasted and heard from the Messenger. (There is in the chapters of Al-Ahzab and Bara-ah the clearest evidence on that). The Messenger knew a number of them. He did not punish the ones whom he knew because he did not find evidence that convicts them or because he hoped that they will reform and become good Muslims. Had he punished them a dispute among his followers might have erupted.
Therefore he preferred to leave them alone for the sake of unity among his companions.
Ashaath was not the only hypocrite in the Imam's camp. Probably there were hundreds and thousands of hypocrites who were feigning loyalty to the Imam and at the same time concealing hostilities towards him. Ziyad Ibn Abeeh Shibth Ibn Rib-i and the hundreds from those who fought with the Imam then participated after that in fighting his son Al-Hussein represent physical evidence of the existence of a great number of hypocrites in the camp of the Imam.
2. The authority of the Imam after the Battle of Siffeen was shrunk to a great degree. The rebellion of the majority against him after Muaweyah's camp hoisted the copies of the Holy Qur'an represented a military coup which left him authority in name only. Had the Imam tried to punish Ashaath for his opposition to the continuation of the battle a large portion of the inhabitants of Kufa (who for one reason or another had attitudes similar to that of Ashaath) would have opposed the Imam. Had the Imam punished Ashaath he would have offended thousands from the tribe of Kindah who used to consider Ashaath their leader. As a matter of fact Ashaath's punishment was expected to alienate the majority of the
Kufites because they were of the Yemenites and so was
( 483 )
Ashaath. The Imam after Siffeen was not in need of more enemies and difficulties.
WHY DID THE IMAM BIND HIMSELF WITH A DOCUMENT WHICH WAS FORCED UPON HIM?
There are two important questions which demand answers:
1. All evidence indicates that the Imam did not stop the war and sign the document of arbitration willingly. He was forced to do that and it is known in the religion of Islam that a forced action is nil. A divorce or marriage or election by force would not be sound. And the rule is the same concerning the Pact of Arbitration. This means that the document of arbitration was not binding to the Imam and that he had the right to disregard it. Furthermore his duty was to cancel it when its cancellation was expected to benefit the camp of truth. Since the Seceders reversed their attitude and tried to return to the battlefield the Imam should have returned to the war without waiting for the decision of the two arbiters.
As to the validity or invalidity of a pact I would like to say that a pact signed by a coerced person is nil if the signer signed it as an individual. When the coerced signer is a head of state and he signs a pact on behalf of Muslims he represents the pact would not be unsound unless the people whom he represented were coerced to accept the pact. When they are the seeker of the pact the pact would be binding as soon as it is signed. The pact has to be honored even if a portion of the representees reverse their attitude towards the pact.
It is well known that the majority of the Imam's camp
including the Seceders were not coerced to discontinue the
fight and accept the arbitration. On the contrary they
were the advocates of both. Repudiation of the pact by the
Seceders after it was signed does not relieve the Imam of
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his responsibility. Furthermore reversal of the Seceders' attitude towards the contents of the pact does not necessarily make its breaching in the interest of the Imam or his camp.
The majority of the advocates of the pact continued their attitude thinking that obeying it is a duty and that they had to wait for the outcome of the arbitration. Had the Irnam breached the pact which he signed he would have faced from the supporters of the c!ocument an opposition more violent than that of the Seceders and his posi tion would have become more difficult than it was before signing the document. For the Imam to go back on a document he signed would only add to the Muslims' confusion.
It would have given Muaweyah an argument against the Imam which the Imam would not be able to defeat. The history which today judges categorically in favor of the Imam would have hesitated or strayed in its judgment if the Imam had done that.
Why Did the Imarn Prolong the Period ofArbitration?
2. The other question which seriously demands an answer is the following: We believe that the Imam was forced to accept the invitation for discontinuing the war and accepting the arbitration and accepting Abu Musa Al-Ashaari and Ibn Al- Auss as arbiters. We know all that but what made the Imam prolong the period of arbitration for several months? It was possible for the two arbiters to meet and to issue their judgment within a week or one month. It was possible for the Imam to stay with his army in Siffeen until the two arbiters issued their decision. Had the Imam done that he would have prevented the development of the dispute and the difference bctween him and the Seceders who repented for their discontinuation of the war. Had he shortened the period of arbitration he would have been
able to return to the battle while accompanying the Se-
ceders as soon as the two arbiters issued their decision. We
( 485 )
should add to this the fact that the Imam was certain that their verdict would not be in his interest because the two arbiters were hostile to him.
The Seceders asked the Imam: Why did you prolong the period of arbitration? He answered: "We wanted to give the ignorant time so that he may know the facts. We wanted to give the one who knows the facts time so that he may become firmer in his belief. And we hoped that God may rectify the affairs of this nation (then the nation would not need to go back to war)."
Nevertheless it was possible for the affairs of the nation to be rectified and the nation would not have needed to go back to war if the two arbiters were expected to validate what the Holy Qur'an validates and to invalidate what the Holy Qur'an invalidates and if Muaweyah were of those who surrender to the rule of the Holy Qur'an. But Muaweyah fought the Imam knowing that his fight was a fight against the Holy Qur'an and against the prophet to whom the Holy Qur'an was revealed. Yet one of the two arbiters was as hostile to the Imam as Muaweyah was. The other one (Abu Musa) was very ignorant and unfriendly towards the Imam. Neither of them was expected to say the truth.
Prolonging the time of the armistice could have added to the firmness of the faithful and enlightened the ignorant. For it gave people a longer time to think without being under the pressure of the events and the influence of emotion. But prolonging the armistice would also prolong the arguments among people escalate differences of the disputing elements in the Imam's camp relieve the enemy for a longer time and enable him to make a new mobilization for a new battle.
The question seems to assume that the Imam at the
time of signing the armistice was aware of the future
repentance of the Seceders for the guilt of discontinuation
of the war and that he knew that they will change their at-
titude and call for the return to the war against Mua-
weyah. Had the matter been so the Imam would not have
needed to accept the invitation for arbitration and the
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whole event of arbitration would not have taken place.
This was not the case. The Seceders were very serious in demanding the cessation of hostility and acceptance of arbitration and they continued this way until the document was executed. They and others from the bigot readers were the power which forced the Imam to stop the war. They did not change their attitude until the document was signed by the two parties and became a pact in full.
The Seceders were not expected to change their attitude with such speed and move within three days from the extreme left to the extreme right. In the first two days they believed that continuation of war and rejection of arbitration represented a disbelief in the religion of God. Then they reversed themselves on the third day and believed that discontinuation of war and acceptance of arbitration represented a disbelief in the religion of God. The Imam responded to their first demand which seemed to be the position of the majority of his camp. He executed the document and he was right in giving them and the rest of the nation a respite that continued a few months with which the matter could become clear to them after they were deceived and confused.
It was logical to expect that the situation would become clear to the Seceders and to others during the months of the armistice and particularly after the two arbiters issued their unjust and contradictory verdict. The Seceders however were not logical neither at the beginning nor at the end. It was impossible for any human mind to predict their extreme and fast changes of thinking. The Imam was not to be blamed because he could not predict the unseen future.
Suppose the Imam had shortened the period of the armistice for one month and stayed with his army in Siffeen until the two arbiters issued their verdict then he called upon his army to return to war. Would that have satisfied the Seceders and reunited the Imam's camp?
The subsequent events make us expect the Seceders to
refuse to return to war and that their attitude if they had
stayed in Siffeen would be similar to the attitude which
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they took in Iraq. The Imam actually called upon them to rejoin him in resumption of war after the two arbiters issued their verdicts. They refused to rejoin him accusing him of wanting to return to the war in order to avenge for himself because the verdict of the two arbiters did not come in his favor. ( 7 )
Had the Imam shortened the time of armistice and remained in Siffeen then tried to go back to war after the end of the arbitration the Seceders could have returned to Iraq waging a campaign of terror cutting the supplies of his army and killing whoever disagreed with them. This was what they did after coming back from Siffeen. ( 8 ) No doubt the danger to the inhabitants of Iraq during his absence would have been greater than it was in his presence.
Thus prolonging the time of armistice and the return to Iraq was less dangerous than shortening it and staying in Siffeen and returning to war without security forces to protect the innocent civilians of Iraq and the roads of supplies against the Seceders' attacks.
It was only rational on the part of the Imam to expect those who demanded cessation of hostility and the acceptance of arbitration to continue with their opinion and wait until the two arbiters issued their verdicts. Had they done that the screen of deception would have been removed when the two arbiters strayed from the right road and invalidated what the Holy Qur'an validated. This would have motivated them to renew the war with a stronger determination clearer sight and bigger preparation. Had they done that it would not have been difficult for them while they were under the bravest leadership to defeat Muaweyah and liberate Syria from his rule. Had they done that they could have secured for themselves the nation and its future generations the brightest future in which justice would be prevalent and the truth would be triumphant.
( 7 ) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.171.
( 8 ) Al-Tabari his History part 5 pp.81-82.
WHY DID THE REIGN OF THE IMAM NOT LAST LONG?
Many historians and writers criticized the policy of the Imam and considered it extremely idealistic and unrealistic. At the same time these critics appeared to be so impressed with the intelligence of Muaweyah and his wiliness that they considered him a statesman of the highest rank.
Critics of this kind usually look at consequences instead of looking at the circumstances which brought about those consequences.
The best way to reach an objective judgement in comparing the two men is to suppose that they had exchanged their circumstances places and times as well as their posts and their qualities except wisdom intelligence and bravery. Let us suppose:
1. Ali was a non -Hashimite Qureshite and he was not responsible for the death of many Qureshites at the Islamic defensive battles during the prophethood era.
2. That he was the governor of Syria since the early portion of Omar's caliphate.
3. That he remained in his post for about eighteen years. Thus the roots of his authority and policy were spread and deepened in Syria.
4. That the people of Syria were the same people at that time in their obedience and unity.
5. That he was an opportunist unconcerned with ideal principles and that he was concerned only with his selfish materialistic benefits allowing himself to acquire those benefits through any means including purchasing people's
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conscience with public funds assassination betrayals lies and killing righteous and innocent people.
6. That the Qureshites who represented the influential aristocracy in the Muslim World loved and supported him.
On the other hand let us also suppose:
1. That Muaweyah was a Hashimite responsible for many Qureshite deaths.
2. That he became caliph after the death of Othman when the unity of the Muslims was broken.
3. That Quraish hated him because he was responsible for the death of many Qureshites.
4. That Ayeshah Talhah and Al-Zubeir accused him of the assassination of Othman and turned a great number of Iraqi people against him and waged against him a costly war in which thousands died.
5. That he stayed in Kufa only a short period after that bloody war.
6. That the people of Iraq were the same people at that time in arguments disputes extremism and disobedience.
7. That Muaweyah was a man of principle concerned with the Hereafter as much as with the present life or more so he would not compromise his principles for his selfish interests. Nor would he allow himself to use any means which are not in accord with the Islamic Law
Then let us suppose that the two men met at a battle such as the battle of Siffeen and each one had what he had of intelligence wisdom and bravery; Ali with his unusual bravery and Muaweyah with his weakness and cowardice.
What would be the outcome? The answer is not difficult. Ali is the triumphant and Muaweyah is the loser politically and militarily.
Even if we delete the 7th condition for Muaweyah and
suppose that the two men were equally opportunistic un-
bound by any principles Muaweyah would be the loser
politically and militarily. This is because the roots
of his authority would not have been spread and deepened
in the land of Iraq due to the shortage of his time in Iraq
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and to the fact that the Iraqi people were not united and inclined by their nature towards arguments dispute and disobedience.
This would be clear when we remember that Muaweyah was about to meet a crushing defeat at the Battle of Siffeen while he Was leading the obedient people of Syria. What would have been the situation if he had had to lead the argumentative and disobedient people of Iraq against the obedient people of Syria? In fact we find that Muaweyah after the Imam was assassinated and after he became the ruler of Iraq was not able to control Iraq except through the Syrian army. Had he not possessed that populous base along with its obedient army he would not have been able to continue ruling Iraq in spite of his lack of principles and abundance of opportunities. What would be his fate if he were a man of principle scrupulous in his religion and deprived of a firm populous base and an obedient army? The historical events during the Omayad period have proven that the ruler of Iraq during that period regardless of his opportunism and lack of all principles would not be able to continue ruling Iraq except through a non-Iraqi task force to which he resorts when a crisis erupts. Al- Hajjaj Ibn Yousef Al-Thaqafi with all his harshness tyranny and extravagance in blood shedding was not able to retain his authority except through the Syrian army.
Had he not had the Syrian military recruits he would have fallen under the blows of the Seceder Shabeeb and his army.
From this we come to the following conclusion: For a ruler to be able to retain his authority he has to possess two important elements:
1. A firm and well-established populous base.
2. An obedient military force capable of supporting him; otherwise his authority would be unstable.
If we know this we would be able to put our hands on
the factors which contributed to the turbulence which per-
sisted in the Imam's era and hastened its end. The two
above mentioned elements: The firm populous base and
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the obedient military force were unavailable to the Imam.
The sequel of events which took place during the period between the death of the Messenger and the Imam's election made the two elements beyond his reach.
ALl DID NOT HAVE THE TWO ELEMENTS
Ali Ibn Abu Talib was logically expected to be the closest person after the Messenger to the hearts of the followers of the Messenger. He is his cousin his son-in- law and the one whom he "brothered." He was after the Prophet the most faithful and the most knowledgeable among the Prophet's companions and the most adherent to the Prophet's teaching. Thus the Muslims who were the followers of the Messenger were and are expected to be genuinely loyal to Ali responsive to his call and obedient to his order more than they were obedient to others. It would have been only natural for Ali to have the two necessary elements for retaining and expanding his authority.
The events of history however did not take their logical sequel. They were rather directed through emotional motives partisan and tribal bigotry and went on through a road opposite of the logical expectation.
The Jealousy of Quraish
The Qureshites refused while Mohammad was in Mecca to respond to his invitation or to acknowledge his prophethood. They knew Mohammad very well. They knew his trustworthiness and truthfulness. The main factor which made Qureshites take such a negative attitude was their jealousy of Hashim the clan of the Messenger.
They thought that recognition of his prophethood meant recognition of the superiority of the Hashimites above the rest of the Qureshite clans the rest of the Arab tribes and the rest of the nations.
The Qureshites refused to acknowledge the proph-
ethood of Mohammad besieged him and his clan and
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used against him their means of pressure and threat then plotted to assassinate him. They forced him to leave his hometown to Medina. When their scheme of assassination failed they resorted to military confrontation. The Messenger the members of his House and his companions stood up defending their freedom and sacred principles against the numerous pagan forces and Qureshite tribes were his main pagan enemy. Motivated by their jealousy they continued their attempts to annihilate the Messenger and his followers.
Ali Ibn Abu Talib was the right hand of the Prophet in all those battles. He was the leader of the defenders and the most efficient in facing the enemy. His strong defense in the battles of destiny cost the Qureshites many lives.
Thus the Qureshite clans held him responsible for the blood of their sons brothers and relatives. By this the Qureshites added a new rancor to their glowing jealousy against the Hashimites in general and inflamed grudges against Ali in particular.
Quraish Retains its Influence and Grudges
Mecca was conquered during the eighth year after the Hijra. Thus the Qureshites declared their Islam after they lost all hopes of obtaining victory against the Prophet. By this the bloody struggle of Quraish against the Messenger and his message came to an end. Yet the grudge of the Qureshites against Ali did not come to an end; nor did the influence of Quraish in the Arab society diminish.
The Messenger attempted to secure for the nation a future in which the nation enjoys security against devia-
tion. That security was a combination of two elements:
The Holy Qur'an and a righteous wise and thoroughly
knowledgeable leadership that walks through the Proph-
et's path. The Messenger saw that Ali and the rest of the
members of his House were the ones who possessed the
needed qualifications. Therefore he declared to the
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Muslims that Ali to him is like Aaron to Moses ( 1 ) and that he is the Moula (guardian) of every believer. ( 2 ) He informed them also that he is leaving in them that which if they uphold they will never go astray the Book of God and the members of his House. He told them that God informed him that the Holy Qur'an and the members of his House will not part with each other until the day of judgment.
Beware he said to the nation how you treat them after me. ( 3 ) By this declaration the Prophet wanted to establish Ali's leadership and to purify the Qureshites' hearts from the pre-Islamic grudges and replace these grudges with the Islamic brotherhood.
Feeling that he was about to depart from this world and that grudges and jealousy may prevent Ali from reaching the leadership of the nation after him the Prophet wanted to take a precautionary measure against what he feared. He decided to send an army headed by Osamah Ibn Zeid Ibn Harithah to Palestine. There was no immediate danger that motivated the Holy Prophet to send that army. Yet he urged outstanding companions such as Abu Bakr Omar Abu Obeidah and Saad Ibn Abu Waqaas to be in the expedition. He evidently intended to send the ambitious companions away from Medina so that Ali would take over without difficulty.
The outstanding migrant companions disliked leaving Medina when they knew that the Prophet had fallen ill and had a high fever. The Holy Prophet attempted several times to send them away saying time after time "implement the expedition of Osama." But the companions refused to leave and waited. ( 4 )
Un written Will
The Prophet witnessed the reluctance of his compan-
( 1 ) Al-Bukhari his Sahih part 5 p.24. And Muslim in his Sahih part 15 p.176.
( 2 ) Al-Hakim Al-Mustadrak part 3 p.109.
( 3 ) Al-Hakim Al-Mustadrak part 3 p.169.
( 4 ) Ibn Saad Al- Tabaqat part 2 p.249.
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ions to leave Medina. Therefore he wanted to decide in the matter and leave no excuse for them. Thus he wanted to dictate while he was in his ailment a document through which his nation will be secured against straying after him.
Those who were present in his room from his companions felt that he wanted to record in writing what he declared concerning Ali verbally. Therefore the influentials among them resisted the will of the Holy Prophet and cast a doubt on his consciousness. They refused to provide him with an inkwell and a sheet for writing saying: The Book is sufficient for us. ( 5 )
The Alternation of the Caliphate
It seems to us that the migrant Meccan companions were influenced by the psychological attitudes of the Qureshites. They felt that the continuation of the rule in the House of the Prophet after his death will prevent the rest of the Qureshites from reaching the caliphate. These companions felt that Ali's succession to the Prophet would make the Arab society accustomed to the rule of the members of the House of the Prophet. Their relationship to the Prophet had already cast on those members a halo of holiness. Furthermore their merit was affirmed by what they had of high quality. Thus it would become impossible for any companions to take the place of these distinguished relatives of the Prophet in the hearts of the Muslims.
Ali in addition to his close relationship to the Prophet
and his special position had the most brilliant record in
the defense of Islam along with a profound knowledge
and a righteousness of the highest degree. His two sons
Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein were declared by the Messenger
of God to be the two leaders of the youth of Paradise ( 6 )
and they would not be so unless they resembled
( 5 )Al-Bukhari his Sahih part 1 p.39.
( 6 ) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.287 Al-Tabari his History part 5 p.425.
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their grandfather and their father. Should the leadership after the Messenger be transferred to Ali no one from the Qureshites or other people could compete with him for the hearts of the Muslims by offering a relationship to the Prophet equal to his or a record equal to his record. Nor would anybody be able to compete with his two sons by offering a grandfather a father or a mother equal to theirs.
Even without considering the prospects of his sons Ali's succession to the Messenger would be sufficient to prevent the ambitious companions from reaching the leadership because of his youth and their old age. Had Ali succeeded the Prophet and lived after the Messenger only thirty years none of the caliphs could have reached the caliphate. They would have died before the end of his rule.
The succession of a non-Hashimite Qureshite to the Prophet therefore was conceived by ambitious companions to be the only means that makes the caliphate accessible to them. By this the non-Hashimite Qureshite clans would be able to alternate the caliphate because they are equal to each other. Thus the honor of the caliphate would compensate those clans for what they missed of the honor of prophethood.
During the days of his caliphate Omar said to Ibn Abbass: "Quraish disliked to see you having both honors of the prophethood and caliphate then you would be unfair to your people (The Qureshites). Qureshites have chosen for themselves and they were right and successful." ( 7 )
If there had been nothing of all this the grudges of Quraish against Ali and the continuation of its influence in the Arab society would have been sufficient to keep Ali away from the caliphate after the Messenger.
The Holy Prophet saw through the light of God what
will happen after him. This saddened him and so he on an
occasion embraced Ali and wept. When Ali asked him:
Messenger of God why do you weep? The Holy Prophet
( 7 ) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.223 and Ibn Al-Atheer in his Kamil part 3 p.34.
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said: "Because of the grudges in the hearts of men which they will show you only after me." ( 7a )
The Attitude of the Two Caliphs Towards Ali
When the Messenger departed from this world the Meccan Migrants and the Medinite companions competed for the caliphate but the Migrants had the edge. They won the race. Their argument against the Medinites was that the Messenger of God is from them and that the caliphate is in them. The majority of the companions elected Abu Bakr without mentioning Ali and without consulting him.
When Ali refused to join the electors they attempted to force him to do so but the daughter of the Messenger stood in their way. Ali did not join the electors of Abu Bakr until the daughter of the Holy Prophet (Fatima) met her Lord. It was only natural for Abu Bakr to find in his heart towards Ali what every human finds towards his only competitor and to find in himself towards Omar what any human can feel towards his dear friend and strong supporter. It was only natural that Abu Bakr rewards Omar by returning the favor and appointing him his successor.
THE GROWTH OF THE QURESHITE INFLUENCE AND THE OBSCURITY OF THE IMAM
The leadership of the first Two Caliphs was expected only to make the non-Hashimite Qureshite influence increase and grow stronger and stronger and this was expected to put Ali in more isolation.
The Obscurity of the Imam
The period of the Two Caliphs was full of important
( 7a ) Al-Muttaqui Al-Hindi Kanzul-Ummal Part 6; Kitab Al-Fadha-il (Book of the Virtues) p.408.
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events and many conquests. This kept people occupied.
The position of the Two Caliphs went high enough to reach the degree of holiness. The names of the military leaders of the conquests and especially the Qureshites among them became well known. People forgot Ali his brilliant record in defending the faith of Islam and his great participation in establishing the foundation of the Muslim State along with what the Messenger of God said about him. People of many nafionalities entered into the domain of the faith of Islam. These people knew the names of the Two Caliphs and the military leaders who subdued those nationalities and the rulers who administered their countries. They did not know anything about Ali and his past.
Ali remained in Medina for the duration of the rule of the three caliphs and he was living in an actual state of isolation from the events and the authority. The Two Caliphs did not appoint him to any post; nor did they appoint any member of his house to any military leadership or civil administration in any part of the Muslim Wold.
Thus people did not know him. The opportunity was not given to any member of his house to be put in a position that would enable him to inform the Muslims about the members of the House of the Holy Prophet and their leader.
The Muslims during the days of the Two Caliphs knew Saad Ibn Abu Waqaas the conqueror of Iraq Amr Ibn Al-Auss conqueror of Egypt and its governor and Muaweyah Ibn Abu Sufyan governor of Damascus. They knew Mugheerah Ibn Shu-abah governor of Bassrah Abu Musa Al-Ashaari its subsequent governor Ammar Ibn Yasir governor of Kufa for a short time and Abdullah Ibn Mas-ood the treasurer of Kufa. These individuals became better known to the conquered nationalities than Ali Ibn Abu Talib. I do not believe that any of these leaders and rulers except Ammar Ibn Yasir and (maybe) Abdullah Ibn Mas-ood was anxious to inform people about Ali and his position in Islam.
I do not say that the Two Caliphs were denying the
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position of Ali and that they did not recognize any of his distinctions. They were too righteous to do that. It is recorded that Omar said: "No one should give a verdict at the Mosque of the Prophet while Ali is present." ( 8 ) He also said more than once: "Had Ali not been present Omar would have perished (spiritually)." ( 9 ) And Omar said about Ali: "By God no pillar of Islam could have been erected without the sword of Ali." (10)
Yes Omar used to say that and more than that but these words used to be said occasionally and never took the form of a general introduction; nor did they pass the walls of Medina. It was easy for the Second Caliph who had an unlimited influence in the Muslim World to introduce to the Muslims the Imam Ali. He could have informed them about what he knew of Ali's distinctions and brilliant record in order to prepare the Muslims in general and the Qureshites in particular to accept Ali's leadership of the nation after him. But Omar did not do that.
The Omayads Infiltrated the Regime
This by itself was not to prevent the Imam from reaching a peaceful reign. The growth of the Qureshites in the Islamic society was not in favor of the Hashimites in general and Ali in particular. Yet it did not represent an insurmountable difficulty to Ali. Had the Omayads remained outside the Islamic Regime Ali could have surmounted that difficulty. Unfortunately the Omayad clan which was the most hostile to the Prophet with the worst grudge against Ali had infiltrated Omar's regime and its influence developed rapidly and it became the strongest Qureshite clan among Muslims.
( 8 ) Abdul-Fattah Abdul-Maqsoud Al-Imam Ali Ibn Abu Talib part 1 p.226.
( 9 ) Abdul-Fattah Abdul-Maqsoud Al-Imam Ali Ibn Abu Talib part 1 p.226.
(10) Ibn Abu Al-Hadeed his Commentary on Nahjul-Balaghah vol.3 p.179.
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The Continuity of Muaweyah and His Governorship
The Omayad influence in the Islamic State was born when Omar Ibn Al-Khattab appointed Yazid Ibn Abu Sufyan as the governor of Damascus shortly after it was conquered. Yazid did not live long. The Second Caliph called upon Muaweyah to succeed him. Shortly afterwards he added Jordan to Muaweyah's authority. (11) Muaweyah continued in his post for the duration of Omar's caliphate.
Omar did not dismiss him though he used to dismiss his official appointees and replace them. He dismissed Saad Ibn Abu Waqaas from the governorship of Kufa in spite of his brilliant past and endeavor. (12) He dismissed Ammar Ibn Yasir though he wrote to the people of Kufa when he appointed him their governor informing them that Ammar is from the distinguished men among the companions of Muhammad. But Omar retained Muaweyah in his post.(13) It seems that the Caliph was impressed by Muaweyah's intelligence his administrative ability and he was confident of his obedience to him.
Muaweyah remained in his post until the Second Caliph departed from this world. He retained him in that post though he witnessed his extravagance and his high standard of living. Muaweyah by his continuation in the governorship of that important province was able to purchase the loyalty of many chiefs of Arab tribes in Syria.
He became powerful enough to make the Second Caliph shortly before he died warn the members of the Electoral Convention not to dispute with each other; otherwise Muaweyah may prevail against them and snatch the caliphate from their hands.
Needless to say the continuity of the rule of Mua-
weyah in Damascus and Jordan for that long period was
expected to prevent Ali from having any populous base
in that province. Muaweyah was expected to close all
(11) Taha Hussein Al-Fitnat Al-Kubra part 1 p.118.
(12) Ibn Saad Al-Tabaqat part3 p. 229.
(13) Ibn Saad Al- Tabaqat part 3 pp.255-256.
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channels through which some information may reach the masses of the people of his region about the past of the Imam and his present.
THE ELECTORAL CONVENTION PUT THE CALIPHATE IN THE HANDS OF THE OMAYADS
However the infiltration of the regime by the Omayads was not a difficulty insurmountable to Ali if Omar had appointed him his successor.
Had Omar appointed him his successor Ali would have been able to uproot the Omayad plantation from the soil of Damascus without much difficulty because that plantation did not reach its ultimate strength during Omar's time.
The Second Caliph with good intentions pushed the caliphate in a direction whose immediate consequences were two developments that made the arrival of the Imam to a peaceful rule impossible.
The first of the two developments was the sudden escalation of the Omayad's power.
When the Second Caliph was stabbed he refused to appoint Ali as his successor ( 14 ) though he repeatedly declared that Ali was the only one qualified among the companions to make the Muslims walk on the clear and straight road.(15) He refused to appoint him because he did not want to shoulder the responsibility of the caliphate after his death. Thus he invented the idea of the Electoral Convention. He put the caliphate in the hands of six Qureshite companions; Ali was one of them; the others were: Othman Abdul-Rahman Ibn Ouf Al-Zubeir Ibn Awam Talhah Ibn Obeidullah and Saad Ibn Abu Waqass. The selected caliph shall be from these alone and these alone shall select him.
Since the passing Caliph knew that Ali was the most
(14) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.228.
(15) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.228.
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qualified among the six members to lead the nation to the right road he was expected to tip the scale in his favor by commanding the Muslims to follow Ali's party if there were two parties among the members of the Electoral Convention. The passing Caliph did what was not expected. He commanded the Muslims to follow the party of Abdul-Rahman Ibn Ouf. Yet this man was expected to choose Othman who was his brother-in-law and this is what he did. Thus the passing Caliph with good intention brought the Omayads to a reality that was beyond their dreams before Omar's era. He indirectly chose for the caliphate Othman the righteous member of his Omayad clan. Yet his righteousness and excessive love of the members of his clan made him a potential bridge through which the caliphate would cross from the early migrant companions to the rest of the Omayads the traditional enemy of the Messenger.
Othman's reign insured for Muaweyah the continuity of his rule with a broader authority and fame. The new Caliph added to the area of Muaweyah's authority Palestine and the rest of the Syrian sub-provinces. ( 16 ) As Muaweyah became the ruler of that vast and rich area his rule became free of higher supervisions. As a result he became the strongest man in the Muslim World. It became possible for him before the Third Caliph met his Lord to put at battlefield a respectable army of a hundred thousand fighters. These were salaried by the Islamic treasury in Syria.( 17)
Muaweyah was not the only Omayad who ruled an important province and purchased the loyalty of Arab chiefs with what was under his authority of public funds. The Third Caliph appointed another Omayad Waleed Ibn Aqaba governor of Kufa who ruled that city for years. ( 18 )
When he was dismissed he was succeeded by another
(16) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.57.
(17) Abdul-Fattah Abdul-Maqsoud Al-lmam Ali part 2 p. 1120.
(18) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p. 252.
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Omayad Sa-eed Ibn Al-Auss. (19) He appointed Abdullah Ibn Amir governor of Bassrah (20) and he also was an Omayad. He also appointed his foster brother Abdullah Ibn Saad Ibn Abu Sarh governor of Egypt. ( 21 ) Marwan cousin of the Caliph and a son of Hakam Ibn Abu Al- Auss who was exiled by the Holy Prophet became the strong minister of the Caliph. (22) In fact he became the actual caliph.
Marwan was able through his strong influence to hide from the eyes and ears of this righteous Caliph all evil doings of these appointed officals and convince him of their righteousness and the necessity of their continuation in their offices. Thus the Muslim World became an Omayad kingdom ruled by individuals of little religion along with opportunism and hatred to the members of the House of the Messenger.
The Iron Curtain
These individuals became the orators of the Islamic pulpits and the teachers of the Muslims. One may imagine the iron curtain which these rulers erected to deprive the various nationalities which they ruled of all means of acquaintance with Ali and the rest of the members of the House of the Holy Prophet and their position in Islam.
Thus the communities of Syria were not acquainted in the least with the members of the House of the Holy Prophet.
This is what Muaweyah stated during the days of the caliphate of Othman when he said to Ammar: "There are a hundred thousand soldiers and a similar number of their sons and their servants who do not know Ali and his relationship." ( 23)
(19) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.279.
(20) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.265.
(21) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.45.
(22) lbn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 pp.82-83.
(23) Abdul-Fattah Abdul-Maqsoud Al-Imam Ali Ibn Abu Talib part2 p. 120.
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The inhabitants of Bassrah were next to the Syrians in lack of knowledge about the members of the House of the Holy Prophet. These people did not have any ruler during the days of Omar and Othman that was sympathetic to the members of the House of the Prophet. People of Kufa seemed to know little about Ali and his House. Evidently the presence of Ammar Ibn Yasir for a short time and Abdullah Ibn Mas-ood for a longer time had contributed to the acquaintance of the Kufites with the members of the House of the Holy Prophet. But that knowledge remained very limited.
To know the effect of the iron curtain which the Omayads erected to insulate the provinces which they ruled against any knowledge about Ali's history and that of the members of his house one needs only to remember the following:
The Muslims who were hostile to the Imam after he was elected were afraid of the presence of Ammar in the camp of the Imam. This was because they heard directly or indirectly that the Messenger said to Ammar "The aggressor party will kill you." (24) But they were not afraid to fight the Imam though the Messenger said more about him than he said about Ammar and all the companions combined. They did not even remember what the Holy Prophet said about Ali in front of the thousands of Muslims on the day of Ghadeer Khum when he declared that Ali is their Moula then he said: "God love whoever loves him and be hostile to whoever is hostile to him."(25)
This statement meant that whoever was hostile to Ali was hostile to God let alone those who fought Ali.
When the Imam wanted to inform people of Kufa
about what the Holy Prophet said about him on the day of
Ghadeer Khum he noticed the signs of doubt on the faces
of his audience. Therefore he was forced to ask whoever
was present of the companions of the Holy Prophet to
(24) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.511.
(25) Imam Ahmad his Musnad part 4 p.281.
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testify to that. Twelve Badrians from among them stood up and attested to his statement. (26)
Most of the Bassrites during the days of Othman were for Talhah and Al-Zubeir was popular among the Kufites. This means that the Imam did not have a majority even in Kufa.
People of Egypt seemed to have some knowledge about the Imam before the death of Othman. Evidently this was a result of the presence of Mohammad Ibn Abu Bakr and Mohammad Ibn Abu Hutheifah in Egypt about the end of the period of Othman when they were tyring to prepare the public opinion for a revolution against the Caliph. From this we can see clearly that the Omayads during the period of Othman had accomplished three of their goals.
1. They were able to block all the informational avenues about Ali in most of the Muslim provinces.
2. They acquired a populous base in Syria and a great influence in the rest of the Muslim provinces through what they bought of loyalty of tribes and influential individuals in every province they ruled. This was the method which they followed wherever they found people ready to sell their religion for material gain and these were numerous in every province. The public funds were under the authority of these Omayads and they were handling those funds according to their whims.
3. What was more important than all that was that the Omayads were no longer in need of reaching the authority and the caliphate. The caliphate and its authority were now in their hands. Anyone seeking the caliphate would have to use a tremendous military force in order to break their grip on the caliphate. These Omayads had possessed the manpower and the money which made them able to retain that authority. They were the opportunists of the Arabs who would not hesitate to use any means regardless of its ugliness if it served their purpose.
(26) Imam Ahmad his Musnad part 4 p.281.
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Tribalism
I should not fail to mention the chronical tribal system of the Arab society which rendered to the Omayads great assistance in developing their power politically and militarily. At a time when mass media was missing it would have been difficult for any politician to win popularity of the masses of people. Such popularity could be gained only when the masses of people are tied up with some leaders through blood relationship which makes them follow those leaders blindly. An individual without this kind of leadership becomes independent. He would do what he could to serve his own particular interest or he follows his logical thinking.
When there are tribal leaderships the loyalty of the thousands becomes easily acquirable by opportunists such as the Omayads especially when the tribal leaders are materialistic-minded. The period during which the Third Caliph ruled increased the number of this kind of leadership because the worldly interests of most of the leaders during that period were put ahead of their religion.
NEW COMPETITORS
The second development which was brought on by the Electoral Convention was the emergence of new rivals who suddenly became powerful enough to compete with Ali for the caliphate. Neither Abdul-Rahman Talhah or Al-Zubeir seriously hoped to become caliph.
By granting these companions membership to the Electoral Convention the Second Caliph promoted them and placed them above the rest of the companions. This inflamed their ambitions and made them feel that they are Ali's equals and that each of them is qualified to lead the nation.
This superiority complex was stronger in the minds of Talhah and Al-Zubeir than it was in the minds of the two other companions Abdul-Rahman and Saad. What Tal-
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hah and Al-Zubeir acquired of enormous fortunes ( 27 ) inflamed in them a spirit of competition for the Islamic leadership. Wealth was and is still a power which renders a tremendous assistance for reaching goals. Their membership in the Electoral Convention opened the eyes of Mother of Believers Ayeshah to the possibility of making one of the two companions the next caliph. The caliphate for either of the two companions was highly desirable to Mother of the Believers because Talhah was a member of her clan Tyme and Al-Zubeir was her brother-in-law.
He was the husband of her sister Asma. ( 28)
Thus the two companions and Ayeshah had shared one line of thinking. This made them start a vicious smear campaign against Othman which did not end until his death. When the Imam was elected after the death of Othman the disappointment and the inflamation of ambition motivated the two companions and Ayeshah to oppose the Imam in a violent way which had no precedent in the history of Islam.
The two companions would not have started such a violent campaign if the Second Caliph had not granted them the membership to the Electoral Convention which made each of them feel that he is equal to the Imam.
The Last Opportunity
The Imam after the death of the Holy Prophet
had constantly showed his serious interest in acquiring the
leadership while the Muslims were still merciful to each
other and united against the enemies of Islam. The Imam
made serious efforts during the days of the Electoral Con-
vention to persuade its members to grant him the leader-
ship. He had foreseen through the light of God that the
(27) Ibn Saad mentioned in his Al- Tabaqat part 3 p. 110 that Al-Zubeir's fortune amounted to 40 million dirhams and on p.222 that Talhah's fortune amounted to 30 million dirhams.
(28) See the first vol. of this book pp.262-264.
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three days of the Electoral Convention were the last opportunity which could enable him to lead the nation to its great goals and destiny while retaining its unity and internal peace. He was fully aware that if the caliphate was diverted away from him the unity of the nation will come to an end. One may remember that the Imam said to the rest of the members of the Convention during that period the following:
"Listen to my words and understand my logic. You may see the leadership after this Convention contested so violently that swords will be drawn and covenants will be breached until you are no longer one community. Thus some of you will be leaders of the camp of deviation and followers of people of ignorance..."(29)
The members heard his words but they did not understand his logic. They were the elders of Quraish whose hearts were filled with grudges against Ali. They were doing their best to keep the caliphate away from him.
Othman was elected and the interest of the Imam in the caliphate came to an end. The sequel of the events during the time of the Third Caliph and the revolution which concluded his period had ended the life of the Caliph as it ended the period of unity.
The Caliphate Was Imposed Upon Him
After the death of Othman the Qureshites lost
for a few days the political initiative and control of the political affairs of the nation. Thus they could not divert the caliphate from Ali this time. The rebels and the majority of the companions of Medina gathered around the Imam requesting him repeatedly to accept the leadership. He refused it because he was able to foresee that the nation was going to face some insane crisis in which it would be difficult for the masses of the people to see the light and know the right road. Therefore he said to them:
"Leave me out and seek other than me. We are facing
(29) Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.37.
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a multicolor situation with numerous faces on which the hearts cannot stand and the minds cannot rest."(30)
But they asked him in the name of God to accept the leadership. They promised him help and obedience. They put him on the spot as they put him face to face with his responsibility. Thus he could not resist them. He accepted their election knowing that they placed on his strong shoulders a burden which a mountain could not carry. He is Ali who never fled from duties regardless of their magnitude.
QURESHITE HOSTILE OR DSERTER?
The Imam was elected and the Qureshite woke up with all their grudges and rancors and with the exception of a few all their leaders rose in arms against the Imam.
The non-ambitious from the righteous Qureshite leaders took a neutral attitude towards the Imam. They refused to help him and many of them refused to elect him though they knew his high distinctions and qualifications
Saad Ibn Abu Waqass one of the members of the Electoral Convention refused to assist the Imam or to elect him though he reported that the Messenger of God said to Ali: "Are you not satisfied to be to me like Aaron to Moses but there shall be no Prophet after me?"(31)
Thus assistance of Ali and his obedience according to this hadith would be assistance and obedience to the Messenger of God as the obedience of Aaron and his assistance were obedience and assistance to Moses.
Abdullah Ibn Omar well known and righteous refused to assist Ali or to elect him though he reported that the Messenger said: " . . . Whoever dies while he does not
(30) AI-Tabari his History part 4 p.434 and Ibn Al-Atheer Al-Kamil part 3 p.99.
(31) Al-Bukhari his Sahih part 5 p. 24 and Muslim also recorded in his Sahih part 15 p.176 that Saad Ibn Abu Waqass reported in this Hadith.
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owe any allegiance to a caliph he would die a pre-Islamic death." (32) He afterwards pledged allegiance to Muaweyah because Abdullah feared that he may die a pre-Islamic death if he did not owe Muaweyah an allegiance. For the same reasons he pledged also his allegiance to Yazid Ibn Muaweyah later. Yet he refused for five years to pledge his allegiance to the Imam and he was not afraid to die a pre-Islamic death.
The Qureshite Aggressors
Righteous and wicked leaders from Quraish competed with each other in combating the Imam. They offered sacrifices in combating him more than they offered of sacrifices in combating the pagans.
The Omayads headed by Muaweyah found in the death of Othman a golden opportunity. The death of Othman was not less beneficial to the Omayads than his life. It is true that his caliphate gave Muaweyah enough power to make him the strongest man in the Muslim State but his assassination gave Muaweyah the means to use that power to achieve the goal for which he was preparing himself since his arrival in Damascus.
While Othman was besieged he asked Muaweyah to relieve him but he did not relieve him. ( 33 ) He did not respond to his call because he wanted him to be assassinated. He sent an army to Hijaz pretending that he was trying to defend him. But he commanded the leader of the army to camp outside Medina and warned him not to enter Medina regardless of the developments of the crisis until he received his order from Damascus. To deprive the commander of that army from all freedom of action he told him: "Do not say to yourself that the present sees what the absent cannot see. You are the absent and I am the present." Muaweyah had acquired all the benefits that he could acquire from the life of Othman. The death of Othman
(32) Muslim his Sahih part 12 p. 240.
(33) Al-Tabari his History part 4 p.368.
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now had become more beneficial than his life. Defending the Caliph may prolong his life until he dies a natural death. The righteousness of the Caliph may motivate him if he passes the crisis safely to appoint an outstanding companion as his successor. Thus Muaweyah would be deprived of the opportunity as he would be deprived of any justification to impose his leadership on the nation.
But a violent death of the Caliph would give him the opportunity and the justification.
From this we know that the Third Caliph did not possess as much political and military power as Muaweyah. He was unable to defend himself while Muaweyah possessed the power to attack his enemies and to protect the life of the Caliph. This means that Othman was the caliph in name only and Muaweyah had the real authority.
When the Third Caliph was assassinated the Omayads lost the caliphate in name only and for a short period.
Muaweyah did not need to acquire the name but to use what he had of power in the way of avenging the death of the assassinated Caliph. He did that and waged against the Imam a war which the Muslims had never witnessed before.
The Righteous Ambitious Qureshites
As the violent death of the Caliph gave Muaweyah a tribal justification to avenge his blood it added to his power a new power. Talhah Al-Zubeir and Mother of the Believers (Ayeshah) who were the arch enemies of the assassinated Caliph joined Muaweyah and became his allies in seeking revenge for the blood which they called on the Muslims to shed. Now they added all their strength to the strength of Muaweyah and preceded him in combating the Imam.
The Battle of Bassrah proved that the three leaders had
a tremendous capability. They were able to mobilize
against the Imam at that battle an army exceeding thirty
thousands while the Imam came from Medina with a few
hundred soldiers. He was forced while on his way to
Bassrah to stay at Thee Qar for a period of time during
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which he made monumental efforts and gathered a task-force which did not exceed twelve thousand volunteers from Kufa. Finally but not until he entered Bassrah the Imam's army numbered twenty thousand.
The three leaders with all their righteousness and brilliant past allowed themselves to divide the Muslims and to draw swords against the Imam and put the followers of the Messenger for the first time in the Islamic history in two camps.
The three leaders along with their army were defeated but they opened by their actions a door on the nation which the Imam could not close in spite of his decisive victory against them. The Islamic division grew after their defeat. The distance between the Imam and the Qureshites increased and so did their grudge against him after seventy of their leaders were destroyed at the Battle of Bassrah.
The people of Bassrah were not to forget the thousands of their sons and brothers who fell in the battlefield.
The people of Kufa were also expected to feel the magnitude of the loss of their sons and brothers in battle.
The death of many of his enlightened supporters in this battle deprived the Imam of a great deal of assistance which they had provided. No doubt the Battle of Bassrah with its decisive victory against the three leaders did not increase the Imam's power. It rather decreased it by decreasing the number of his supporters.
Those who were in sympathy with his enemies yet hesitant to combat him found in the attitude of the two companions and "Mother of the Believers" what encouraged them to join his enemy in combating him. If these three righteous leaders found it legal to fight Ali why should people with less righteousness hesitate to fight him? From this we know that the three leaders offered to Muaweyah and his party great services which added a new power to his growing power.
The three leaders no doubt were able to realize the opposite of these results and preserve the unity of the nation if they had been consistent with themselves and their
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past. They were calling for reform and criticizing the Third Caliph for his illegal conducts. They urged people to bring his reign to an end through any means because of the corruption of the relatives of the Third Caliph. As the Imam Ali came to power trying to realize what they were calling for the three leaders were duty-bound to follow the Imam and assist him in realizing his goals. Muaweyah and his party had malicious intentions towards the nation and they were trying to usurp the authority from the one who was the most qualified to lead the nation. It was the duty of the three leaders to go to Iraq Egypt and the rest of the sources of the Islamic power and wage an educational campaign informing the nation of the malicious intention of Muaweyah and his party towards the nation.
They could have urged the Muslims to assist the Imam in combating the evil elements. Had they done that Muaweyah would have realized that what he was aiming for was beyond his reach and he would have surrendered humbly to the Imam. Had this happened the nation would have preserved its unity and remained as God wanted it led by the best leader after the Messenger.
The three leaders should have at least convicted themselves for causing the death of the Third Caliph rather than fighting the Imam pretending to avenge a blood which they had shed.
The insulin which the membership of the Electoral Convention injected in the veins of the two companions and the chronical hatred of Mother of the Believers towards the Imam coupled with her hope to bring one of her two relatives to the leadership were bound to blind the three leaders. Thus they waged their vicious campaign which led to the assassination of the Third Caliph and tried to kill the Fourth Caliph in order to reach the caliphate unconcerned with the future of Islam.
CONCLUSIONS
As we summarize the circumstances and important
events which preceded the election of the Imam or ac-
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companied his reign we come to the following conclusions: 1. These events and circumstances which deprived the Imam Ali of an established populous base and a sufficient and obedient military force were not of his own making and he was unable to eliminate them or control them.
It was not within the power of the Imam to purify the hearts of the Qureshites of jealousy towards the Hashimites because of the Prophethood. It was not in the hands of the Imam to avoid the grudges of the Qureshites against him because of what they lost of relatives through his defense of Islam unless he had avoided the defense of the Messenger and his religion. It was not within his power to change the determination of the Qureshites to alternate the caliphate among them nor was he able to remove their fear of resting the caliphate in the House of the Prophet if Ali comes to power.
It was not within his power to make the first Two Caliphs look at him as a non-rival; nor was it possible for him to stop the growth of the Qureshite influence during the reign of the two Caliphs.
It was not within the power of the Imam to prevent the Second Caliph from admitting the Omayads into his regime; nor was it within the power of the Imam to prevent the Second Caliph from keeping Muaweyah in the post which made his power grow.
It was not within the power of Ali to make Omar appoint him as his successor; nor was it possible for the Imam to prevent the Second Caliph from forming the Electoral Convention; nor was the Imam able to prevent Omar from planning the Electoral Convention the way he did and by which Othman won the caliphate and Ali lost it.
It was not possible for the Imam to prevent the Second Caliph from admitting Talhah and Al-Zubeir into the Electoral Convention; nor was it possible for the Imam to gain the love of Ayeshah arid her loyalty and to prevent her from working to put her two relatives and companions of the Prophet in the leadership.
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It was not within the power of the Imam to separate Othman from his opportunist relatives or to prevent him from making them governors of the important provinces of the Muslim State and giving Muaweyah enough power to make him a state within the State.
It was not possible for the Imam to prevent these Omayad officials from blocking all channels of information about him and preventing the nationalities which they ruled from knowing about Ali's distinctions and high qualifications.
It was not within the power of the Imam to prevent the revolution which destroyed the caliphate of Othman and ended his life. It was not possible for the Imam to prevent Talhah Al-Zubeir and Mother of the Believers from pretending to seek avenge for the blood of Othman in order to usurp the authority from him. It was not possible for him to prevent them from inflaming the war of Bassrah.
It was not possible for the Imam to change the tribal ways of the Arab society or to prevent corruption of the conscience of many chiefs of the tribes and their readiness to sell their religion for their worldly materials.
It was not possible for the Imam to prevent Muaweyah from exploiting the death of the Third Caliph nor was it possible for him to prevent the Syrian people from obeying Muaweyah.
The Imam was not to be blamed for any of these things; and he was not to be blamed because he did not make the people of Iraq as obedient as the people of Syria.
It was not possible for the Imam to change the structure of the Iraqi people who were composed of some righteous indiviuals and a class of ignorant and extremist readers of the Holy Qur'an and ignorant fanatics along with tribes who were ready to obey their chiefs right or wrong.
Muaweyah should not be given credit because of the lack of the Readers class in his society and the rarity of righteous people and the numerous ignorants among the people of Syria during that period.
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Remarkable Achievements
2. As we look at the circumstances of the Imam and the difficulties accumulated in his way before his election and afterwards we find that he realized the impossible. In order to appreciate that we need not do more than to remember that he came out of Medina with only a few hundred volunteers to face the three leaders who mobilized more than thirty thousand to combat him at Bassrah.
This took place at a time when Muaweyah had an army that was three times larger than the army of the three leaders with which he was able to threaten any of the provinces which were under the Imam's authority. In the meantime Abu Musa Al-Ashaari governor of Kufa was urging the Kufites to let the Imam down leading them to what we call now a civil disobedience. The Imam after all his efforts was not able to mobilize from the Kufites and others except a limited number of volunteers through whom his army numbered twenty thousand.
With all the difficulties which beset him the Imam was able to hand the three leaders along with their huge army a resounding defeat. He turned to his bigger enemy and he was able to strangulate him and hand him a military defeat which Muaweyah could not avoid except through the conspiracy of lifting the copies of the Holy Qur'an and the readiness of the volatile Iraqi people to be deceived.
Due to his unusual efficiency the reign of the Imam continued for 5 years in spite of all the difficulties and limitations imposed on him by his unwavering principles.
Muaweyah's Inefficiency
3. Muaweyah did not excel in using his military power. Had he been at the efficient level which his admirers think he was he would have used his military superiority at the beginning of the caliphate of the Imam.
The three leaders occupied the city of Bassrah and mobilized their forces while the Imam did not have but a few hundred soldiers.
Had Muaweyah been that intelligent and brave as a
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leader he would have exploited the opportunity of military weaknesses of the Imam by sending an army to occupy Kufa when his allies occupied Bassrah. By this he could have deprived the Imam from the Kufan assistance and he would have brought the reign of the Imam during that period to an end. As a matter of fact Muaweyah was able to send a division of his army to Medina and occupy it while the Imam was on his way to Bassrah.
Had the Imam had a situation like that of Muaweyah and Muaweyah was in the position of the Imam (as we tried to hypothesize at the beginning of this chapter) the Imam would have done that and brought the reign of Muaweyah to its end within weeks.
Yet we find Muaweyah with all his military potential lacking the courage and intelligence and staying in Damascus waiting until Talhah and Al-Zubeir and their army fell under the blows of the Imam. Thus the Imam after wards was able to mobilize a striking force which he led in combating Muaweyah in his own province where he pushed him nearly to the end.
In spite of all the difficulties which accumulated in front of him since the death of the Holy Prophet and multiplied after his election the Imam appeared as a mountain that was unshakable by all storms that were surrounding him. Had the people of Kufa alone gone with him to the end of the road he could have eliminated the evil forces from the Muslim World and led the nation to a future full of good and illuminated from every side. Had the Imam been obeyed by the Kufites to eliminate the menace of Muaweyah he could have purified the Muslim society and driven it to the right road. Thus the faith of Islam could have been spread enough to convert Europe and subsequently America whose people had mostly come from Europe.
Unfortunately people of Kufa experienced what other Muslim communities experienced. They lost their determination and their power was neutralized. They let the Imam down at the decisive hour and the whole nation lost its final opportunity.
( 518 )
Responsibility of the Non-Iraqi Muslims
The Iraqis were not the only people who were to blame for what happened. The responsibility was that of the whole nation which refused to assist the truth and took towards the Imam and his right either a hostile or neutral attitude; and those who were hostile were more numerous than those who were neutral.
The students of history of that Islamic period ought to be amazed by what happened to the Muslims when they lost their mental capabilities and deviated from the right road. The Almighty was disobeyed while righteous people were idly looking on and some of them went on assisting the devious camp while they were separated from the Messenger by only twenty-five years.
The two groups went on competing in combating the Brother of the Messenger with a fervor which they did not demonstrate even in their combating the pagan forces. The two allied groups pushed the masses of the people to batties in which the nation swam in blood.
The nation and its subsequent generations paid and are still paying the price of the insanity of that generation.
The price they paid was the best that Islam had given: justice freedom and dignity. The nation brought the reign of the Imam to an end and by that it ended the Righteous Caliphate forever.
Why Did the Caliphate Not Live Long?
What happened should make us ask: Was the purpose of the faith of Islam to make the Righteous Caliphate last only thirty years? Or was the purpose to provide the nation and its future generations with unity brotherhood and justice? Was the purpose to make the faith of Islam a way of life for the Muslims for only three decades? If the purpose was to continue life according to the Heavenly Message for a long time why did the Righteous Caliphate live so shortly? And why did it have such a fast and sudden death?
( 519 )
The end of life for the true caliphate within such a short time should make us ask the following questions: Was this sudden death a natural result of the adherence of the Muslims to a program that was planned by the Messenger (because according to a prominent School of Thought he left it to his companions to elect a successor after him)?
Was the sudden death of the caliphate a natural result of the Muslims' negligence of a program planned by the Messenger who according to another prominent Islamic School of Thought chose a successor to lead the nation after him but his companions did not accept the leadership of the Prophet's choice?
Since we have to discuss this it would be appropriate to raise the two following questions:
I. Should the first succession have been by inheritance election or by appointment from the Prophet?
2. If it were supposed to be by appointment from the Prophet did the Prophet appoint anyone? We shall attempt in the following pages to answer these two important questions.
