The Philosophy of Aristotle
I. The Life of Aristotle
Aristotle (picture) was born at Stagira, a Greek colony of Thrace, in the year 384 B.C. His father, a Macedonian named Nicomachus, was a physician in the court of Amyntas II, King of Macedonia.
After the death of his parents, Aristotle's education was directed by Proxenus of Atarneus. In his eighteenth year, Aristotle went to Athens and entered the Academy of Plato, remaining there about twenty years, until the death of the master.
During Plato's last years, Aristotle collaborated with the master in the revision of his works. After Plato's death, Aristotle went to Assus, a city of the Troad, where he lived for three years. His friendship with Hermias, ruler of the city, led to his marriage to Pythias, the ruler's niece and adopted daughter.
About 343 B.C. Aristotle withdrew to Mitylene; during the same year he was summoned by King Philip to the court of Macedonia to educate Prince Alexander, then a youth of thirteen years. Aristotle remained there for three years, until the beginning of the famous Asiatic expedition.
Alexander was grateful for the education received, and supplied his master with the financial means to form a library and to assemble a museum of natural history with which Aristotle enriched his school. Aristotle had returned to Athens in the year 335. B.C., and there had opened a school in the gardens dedicated to Apollo Lyceios.
The school was hence called the Lyceum, and also the Peripatetic School, probably from Aristotle's custom of teacher, discussing and conversing with his pupils while walking along the shady lanes of the garden. He taught in the Lyceum for twelve or thirteen years, and composed the greater part of his books during that time.
In 323 B.C., upon the death of Alexander, there was reawakened in Athens conflict between the followers of the Macedonian party and the enemies of Alexander. The national reactionaries were led by the great Greek orator Demosthenes.
Aristotle, as a Macedonian sympathizer, was accused of impiety, which meant that he would be called to judgment to hear the sentence of death passed upon himself. He anticipated the condemnation and voluntarily retired to Chalcis, where he possessed a villa inherited from his mother.
It is said that while departing for exile he uttered these words, referring to the condemnation of Socrates: "I do not wish that Athens should sin twice against philosophy."
His school, including the library and the museum of natural history, went to his disciple Theophrastus. Aristotle died in 322. B.C., at Chalcis in Euboea.
II. The Works of Aristotle
Aristotle, whom Plato is said to have surnamed "The Intellect," certainly had the loftiest mind ever known in Greece, and perhaps in the entire human race. He is the type of true philosopher who, not allowing himself to be distracted by practical and political motives, lives entirely engrossed in his speculations.
The books edited by him and comprising all the knowledge of his day number about a thousand. Of these works, some were destined for the public, and some for Aristotle's school. The greater part of his works has been lost, but some important parts have been preserved, that is, those works destined for his school and representing the philosophic thought of this greatest of philosophers.
The complete edition was published for the first time by Andronicus of Rhodes about the middle of the last century before Christ. Following the classification of Andronicus of Rhodes and passing over the scientific books which have no direct connection with philosophy, the works of Aristotle comprise the following groups:
1. Logic
The works on logic were called the Organon, that is, an instrument of learning. The Organon includes the following:
The Categories On Interpretation Prior Analytics (on the syllogism) Posterior Analytics (on Demonstration) Topics Sophistic Refutations
2. Physics
The works on physics comprise the body of doctrine which is today embraced by cosmology and anthropology:
Physics (in eight books) Concerning the Heavens (in four books) Concerning Birth and Corruption (in two books) Meteorology (in four books) On the Soul (in three books)
3. Metaphysics
Aristotle's Metaphysics is usually divided into fourteen books. These are a compilation made after the death of Aristotle and are based on manuscript notes referring to general metaphysics and theology. The name "metaphysics" is due to the position of these works in the collection edited by Andronicus; they appeared "after the works on physics."
4. Ethics and Politics
Nichomachean Ethics (in ten books, dedicated to Aristotle's con, Nicomachus, named after Aristotle's father) Eudemian Ethics The Great Ethics Politics (in eight books, unfinished)
5. Rhetoric and Poetry
Rhetoric (in three books) Poetics (in two books)
These books, of course, are only a part of the works of Aristotle.
III. Introduction to Aristotle's Doctrine
Plato had split reality into two worlds:
The World of Ideas (eternal, immutable, unchangeable, like the "being" of Parmenides, but fashioned according to the Socratic concept); and The World of Sensible Things (mutable, changeable, like the "being" of Heraclitus).
Plato had been induced to divide the world of reality because he believed that only by such a separation could he give metaphysical foundation to the concept of Socrates without denying Heraclitus' doctrine of "fluent reality" -- the object of immediate experience.
Aristotle found that the weakest point of his master's doctrine lies in this separation of the world of Ideas from the world of sensible things. "It would seem impossible for the substance and that which is the substance to exist in separation." (1)
How can Ideas be causes of the motion and change in the visible world if Ideas are separate from things? Plato had held that Ideas are patterns or models of things. Aristotle holds that to say this "is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model of Ideas?" (2) Since Ideas are separated from reality and are themselves immutable, unchangeable, they cannot be the cause of the motion and of change in sensible things.
Nor does the teaching of separate Ideas help toward the knowledge of other things, for Ideas are not the substance of particulars, but are separated from them. Hence, how would it be possible to have any knowledge of sensible substances if what constitutes these substances (Ideas) is really separated from them?
The cause of motion and change, according to Aristotle, must be sought in the thing itself as an immanent element of the reality. Only when an understanding of the factor or factors of motion is had can we have a true knowledge of things; for these factors of motion are the key to understanding the concept of Socrates.
Thus any investigation must start from things which begin to be, develop, and then pass away. Although sensible reality is in continuous "becoming," the "factors" of this becoming are unchangeable, immutable. Only when the causes of motion are grasped as intrinsic factors of motion itself will we have a true understanding of reality, i.e., knowledge by causes.
In other words, the intelligibility of sensible things must be sought in the things themselves, and not in a separate world of Ideas, as Plato believed.
References:
(1) Metaphysics, XIII, 1079b.
(2) loc.cit.
IV. Theory of Knowledge (Epistemology)
Comprehension and Extension
Logic, of which Aristotle was the first systematizer, essays to state the relationships existing between one concept and another, with the purpose of forming an intrinsically organized entity which will enable the intellect to pass from one truth to another by showing the reasons for such passage.
To achieve this purpose, logic starts by analyzing each concept. Thus logic may determine:
what are the logical elements of each concept -- in other words, its comprehension; what is the field of application of each concept -- in other words, its extension or the number of beings mentally represented by that concept.
(For example, the concept "animal" comprehends the following characteristics or logical elements: an animal has a body, it is organic, it requires nourishment, it is sensitive, etc.; the concept "animal extends to both non-human animals and man.)
It is easy to see that comprehension and extension are in inverse relation; the greater the comprehension, the less the extension of the concept, and vice versa. Thus if we increase the comprehension of the concept "animal" by adding another element, for instance "rationality," the extension of the concept will decrease, because it is now no longer applicable to non-human animals but only to men. With non-human animals excluded, the extension is proportionately decreased.
Again, concepts may be classified according to their extension and comprehension. If we were to arrange them on the rungs of a ladder, as it were, top place would be occupied by the concept with the greatest extension (but with the minimum of comprehension); inversely, the bottom would be taken by the concept with the least extension (but with the maximum of comprehension).
In such an arrangement, each intermediary concept is a species in relation to the concept above it, and a genus in relation to the concept below it. In this method of classification (by descending from genus to species), the last place will be taken by concepts having an individual extension ("this individual is John and no one else"); and the individual is neither species nor genus.
The Categories
By ascending the ladder (from species to genus), top place will be taken by a genus which is not a relative species, since there is no concept above it; hence it is called supreme genus. These supreme genera are also called categories (or predicaments), and according to Aristotle they are ten in number:
substance (who or what is this thing?) quantity (how much or how big?) quality (what sort of thing is it?) relation (to what or whom does it refer?) activity (what does it do to another?) passivity (what is done to it?) when (at what point of time?) where (where is it?) site or posture (in what attitude?) habit (how surrounded, equipped; how conditioned?)
Such analysis and classification make it possible for us to know the general predicament or class under which a concept is located, and also the difference which distinguishes it from other species of the same genus.
Definition
Now, to know the genus and the specific (or specifying) difference of a concept is the same as knowing its definition or essence. For example, the definition (or essence) of man is rational animal: that is, proximate genus -- animal; and specific difference -- rational.
According to Aristotle, the differentia is not something diverse and distinct from the genus, but is rather the actuation (or form) of the same essence which existed virtually in the genus. Thus "animal" may be rational: that animal in which this potentiality to rationality is actuated is man.
Here we must observe that in giving the definition of a concept ("man is a rational animal") the intellect makes a judgment, which consists in affirming (or denying) that something (the predicate) belongs (or does not belong) to something else (the subject).
Characteristic of the judgment is truth or falsity. Such a possibility was not present in the simple concept, in which nothing was affirmed or denied. On the contrary, the presence of error is possible in a judgment, in which the logical affirmation of the relationship of the predicate to the subject may not correspond with reality.
The possibility of error forces the mind to demonstrate that a given judgment is true. This means that the intellect must find the reasons which ensure that the proposed judgment is in conformity with reality. Such reasons, giving the mind certainty that a judgment is true, are the foundation for perfect knowledge, since perfect knowledge is knowledge through causes.
The Syllogism
According to Aristotle, the best method of leading the mind to perfect knowledge is the syllogism. The syllogism is an argumentation formed from three judgments so connected with one another that from the truth of the first two (the premises) the mind draws out a third truth (the conclusion) necessarily connected with the premises.
The syllogism shows that the cause (or reason) for connecting the predicate (P) of the conclusion to the subject (S) of the same conclusion is that both predicate and subject are connected necessarily with a third concept (M), called the middle term, in the premises. According to the principle of identity, therefore, such a connection must be affirmed necessarily in the conclusion also.
Aristotle stated three figures of the syllogism; the first is the best and may be presented as follows:
All men (M) are mortal (P); Socrates (S) is a man (M); Therefore, Socrates (S) is mortal (P).
This syllogism shows that the reason (or cause) which makes Socrates mortal is that mortality is an element necessarily connected with his being a man.
It is clear that the truth of the conclusion is conditioned on the truth of the premises. In other words, supposing that the premises express a necessary truth, the conclusion will also express a necessary truth. The truth of the premises, it is supposed, has been proved by another syllogism, and so on.
First Principles
But, according to Aristotle, this process cannot be extended ad infinitum; it is necessary that the mind reach some judgments which do not need any demonstration because they are evident from within. Such are the logical fundamental principles, the most important of which is the principle of contradiction, which was formulated by Aristotle in the following manner:
"A thing can not be and not-be at the same time in the same manner." (1)
The first principles of reason are universal, that is, valid for the whole of human knowledge, both philosophical and scientific. This means that philosophy and the sciences must start from these principles, and must deduce from them the particular principles which are the foundation of each kind of knowledge.
Aristotle spoke also of induction, which means the passage from particular to universal knowledge. According to Aristotle, concepts are the result of induction; the form, which is always particular in individuals, is a universal concept as soon as it is considered as abstracted from the individuating characteristics; this passing from the particular to the universal Aristotle calls induction. Since the concepts are the matter of the propositions and these latter the matter of the syllogism, we can say that induction prepares the material for perfect reasoning.
References:
(1) Metaphysics, IV, 3, 1005b.
V. General Metaphysics
A. Analysis of Being in Becoming: Matter and Form, Potency and Act.
Aristotle starts from the solid ground of experience.
Experience shows us that only individual substances exist, and all exist in the substance and are predicated of the substance. Moreover, experience shows us that individuals are not produced by some Idea or model, but are produced by other individuals of the same species.
The fact of generation tells us that first of all there must be an individual, who by the act of generation is able to produce a new reality as germ or seed. In virtue of this act of generation, the germ or seed receives the power of reproducing another individual specifically the same as the generator; for man generates man, and oak generates oak.
The power of reproducing a new individual is the very form of the seed; because, for Aristotle, every form is a force or a potency for developing what is virtually contained within the subject. Thus the immanent form of the seed or germ is a potency for developing a perfect being (it has the power of becoming man or oak). The development from the state of potency to the state of perfect being is called becoming.
To make this development possible, it is necessary to suppose some substratum or matter on which the successive forms of development can be realized until the last form is reached (the perfect or completed individual). This substratum is called matter, by which is meant all those conditions which make possible the passage of successive forms. To function thus, this substratum or matter must remain unchangeable.
Moreover, experience shows us that the forms in the development of a living being proceed from an inferior to a higher form, not by change but by a predetermined form, which specifically is the same as that of the individual that produced the germ or seed.
This predetermined form (entelechy) is always immanently present, coordinating and distributing the matter not arbitrarily but according to that specific from within -- in this instance, man or oak. The idea of the entire individual is present within the seed from the first moment as an immanent potency and does not cease its activity until the perfect (completed) individual is attained.
Now, as a first result of this analysis of becoming, we are able to determine and understand Aristotelian terminology.
Only individuals are beings in the full sense of the term. Every individual is a compound of matter and form. Matter is an indeterminate element: the form is the determining element; it is the force, power -- or better, the potency -- developing the whole which is virtually contained within the individual. Thus it is called active potency. Matter, considered as the complex of those conditions which make possible the activity of the form, is called passive potency.
Every form, since it designates some actual determination of matter, is also called act. Thus the analysis of the development of a living being has given us the concept of matter (substratum), form (determining element), potency (both active and passive), and act.
Aristotle extends the results of the analysis of the development of a living being to a work of art, that is, to artificial becoming. Let us take the classic example of the piece of marble which becomes a statue.
Here, too, first of all, there must be an artist who conceives the "idea" of the statue which he wants to bring forth in the marble.
Secondly, the marble, which already possesses its own shape -- for instance, that of a cube -- is supposed to be capable of losing this shape and assuming that conceived by the artist. In other words, the marble must be in passive potency in order to assume the form of a statue.
Thirdly, the marble, under the action of the tools used by the artist, loses its former shape and becomes a statue. The action of the artist ceases when the marble has passed into the new form, that of a statue.
This process is analogous to that of the development of the living organism. There are, however, some interesting differences.
In the development of a living organism, the seed is predetermined by nature to all the successive forms which are intermediary means of reaching that specific form which is the last.
The marble, on the contrary, is not determined by its form of marble to be this rather than that statue or something else. Here the determination comes extrinsically, from the idea of the artist -- as does also the origin of the active potency to produce such a statue; whereas in the living organism this active potency is immanent in the seed.
However -- the artificial becoming also consists in a union of matter and form.
B. The Four Causes of Becoming
The preceding analysis showed that four causes are acting upon the being in the process of becoming:
There is an efficient cause, and it is that which gives the impulse to movement or development (the generator as becoming takes place in nature, and the artist as becoming takes place in art); There is a material cause, the permanent and indeterminate substratum of the successive transformations (organic matter in the case of the living organism, and the marble in the case of the statue); There is a formal cause, established by the forces within the idea (the form of species in the living organism, and the idea conceived by the artist in works of art); There is a final cause, that which directs the entire series of transformations on a pre-established plane, giving unity to the entire course of the development (which results in the complete organism in natural becoming, and the complete statue in artificial becoming). (1)
It is interesting to note that, according to Aristotle, three of the above-mentioned causes -- namely the efficient cause, the formal cause, and the final cause -- logically are reducible to the idea of "form." In the development of a natural organism -- for instance, that of man --
The efficient cause or generative act is possible in so far as the acting individual (generator) possesses, already realized, the "form" of man; The formal cause, immanent in the germ, organizes the matter step by step and gives it exactly the "form" required by the species to which the germ belongs (thus the efficient cause is the same as the formal cause, if we consider the latter in its actual development); The final cause, considered as the model toward which the steps of development tend, is the same as the formal cause.
Thus the efficient cause, the formal cause, and the final cause coincide in the concept of "form." Hence form is the propelling, organizing and final principle of becoming.
C. Priority of Act
For Aristotle, only individuals exist as true realities, and individuals are in continuous development. Every development, however, is conditioned in the sense that it presupposes a reality already possessing the complete form, which is the origin of movement.
"The seed comes from other individuals who are prior and complete, and the first thing is not seed but the complete being; for example, we must say that before the seed there is a man; the man is not produced by the seed but by another from whom the seed comes." (2)
Likewise the statue presupposes the idea of the artist.
The priority of act over potency, the determinate over the indeterminate, the perfect over the imperfect, is one of the most outstanding principles of Aristotle's philosophy.
Every becoming is a movement, a passage from potency to act; and every movement depends upon the existence of a mover, which is in act; that is, which already possesses the form toward which the movement tends. The mover is in act what the moved is in potency; and because it is act, it can impart movement; that is, it can start the process of movement.
D. The Limits of Becoming: Prime Matter and Immovable Mover
From the above-mentioned principle Aristotle draws the most important conclusion of his speculative thought; development or movement, related not to this or that particular individual but to the whole universe, must have two limits, one deriving from matter and the other from form. In other words, becoming presupposes a lowest point (Prime Matter) and a highest point (the immovable Mover).
Prime Matter
The lowest point is Prime Matter, which must be conceived of as without any force of movement; it must be absolutely indeterminate, pure potency. But is a being without any form thinkable?
Let us try to explain this important point of Aristotelian philosophy.
Seed is matter in respect to a plant, as marble is matter in respect to a statue. Truly here by "matter" we mean the "indeterminate"; but evidently, in the aforementioned instances, such an indetermination is not absolute but relative.
Seed and marble are determined as such; at the same time they are determinable by the higher forms of plant and statue. In other words, seed and marble as such are compounds of matter and form, and, of course, are determinate beings.
However, they are called "matter" in relation to the higher form (plant or statue in our instance) which can be attained by the seed or the marble.
Thus our concept of "matter" is relative to the higher form, and seed and marble are called "matter" in so far as they are "in potency" as regards the completed plant or statue.
In other words, our concept of matter is obtained by a regressive process of mind from the higher to the inferior condition which was the substratum of the production of the new individual form. Going back along this regressive process, we must finally arrive at matter deprived of any form whatever.
For instance, we can deprive the marble not only of the form of the statue but also of the form of marble and reduce it to the elementary substances which concurred in the formation of marble; and these elementary substances can be deprived of their own forms, and so on, until we reach "matter" absolutely without form -- pure potency. This is what Aristotle called Prime Matter.
"For when everything else is removed, clearly nothing but matter remains...By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor quantity nor designated by any of the categories which define being." (3)
Prime Matter does not exist as such independently of any form. According to Aristotle, only individuals exist that are composed of matter and form.
However, Prime Matter is not a mental abstraction, but a metaphysical reality. How it would be possible to have a metaphysical entity, which on the one hand is pure potency, absolutely indeterminate, and, on the other hand, is naturally disposed to receive any form whatever, is not made clear by Aristotle; and, of course, it is one of the obscure points of his metaphysics.
God, the Immovable Mover
The highest point is the immovable Mover, God. Aristotle proves the existence of God by force of the above-mentioned principle: "priority of act over potency."
This proof may be summed up as follows: Becoming is the passage from potency to act. This transition cannot be effected without appealing to a mover which would activate the potency.
But again, this mover, if it be in the series of becoming, would derive its motion from a second, and so on. Such tracing of the object moved and the mover cannot go on into an infinite series, for, if so, the problem of becoming would remain unsolved.
It is necessary to stop at a prime mover which would be outside this series of becoming, and which moves but is itself unmoved, the immovable Mover, God.
The necessity of admitting the first and immovable Mover does not depend on the fact of whether becoming has a beginning. Even if the world is without a beginning (as Aristotle supposed it to be, because of his lack of a concept of creation), its becoming would remain ever inexplicable without a prime, immovable Mover, the absolute cause of all becoming.
Having thus formulated his proof for the existence of God, Aristotle gives himself to the task of determining God's nature. God is Pure Act, intermingled with no potency.
Since, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, knowledge of the world would imply duality between knower and known, he denies to God any knowledge of earthly becoming. Consequently, God is thought, which revolves upon itself, Thought of Thought, as Aristotle expresses it.
Cosmic reality has a pronounced aspiration toward God, and in this sense God moves the world. But He is not the Creator of this cosmic reality, and does not have any direct relationship to it. He is the exemplary (final) cause and the efficient cause of becoming, but He is ignorant of this reality and hence does not govern it.
If we compare the God of Plato (Highest Good) with that of Aristotle, we can say that in both there remains dualism: God is distinct from uncreated and co-eternal reality. Aristotle's proof for the existence of God through the notion of becoming is superior to that of Plato, whose proof consists in the intelligible substratum of all intelligible things (Ideas). Aristotle's explanation is frankly metaphysical, while Plato's is logical.
With reference to the nature of God, while Plato recognized in God the attribute of modeler or fashioner of the material universe (Demiurge), and hence also recognized the attribute of providence, these endowments are absent from the God of Aristotle.
Thus, though a development in metaphysics is achieved through Aristotle's proof for the existence of God, in matters of religion Aristotle's contribution involves a step in reverse.
References:
(1) Metaphysics, II, 994a and b; Physics, II, 3 and 7.
(2) Metaphysics, XII, vii, 1073a.
(3) Metaphysics, VII, iii, 1029a.
VI. Cosmology
Cosmology as a science of nature (it was called physics by Aristotle) is connected with chemistry, physics and astronomy, sciences which were in a rudimentary state during the time of Aristotle. As a consequence Aristotle's cosmology is the weakest part of his philosophical system. We shall limit ourselves to giving a brief summary of this branch of his teaching.
Aristotelian cosmology is based on the principle of the mover and the thing moved. It is dualistic: God, Pure Act, immovable Mover, who transcends cosmic reality; and cosmic reality, consisting of the heavens which rotate around the earth.
Every sphere of the heavens is formed of incorruptible matter. God moves the highest sphere. The form of the sphere is round, and the spheres' movement is circular (the sphere is considered as the most perfect body).
The earth, which is at the center of the universe (geocentric system), receives its movement from the heavenly spheres, but it has characteristics opposed to them. It is formed of the four essences of Empedocles, and its motion is from higher to lower or vice versa. Movement, which comes from the heavenly bodies, is the proximate cause of all the becoming in the world.
In the cosmology of Aristotle there are some theoretical points that are worthy of consideration. Precisely because these points are theoretical they do not have essential dependence upon his physics.
Change is the passage from potency to act and is of four kinds:
Substantial (change of the substantial form, birth and death); Qualitative (change of some quality); Quantitative (increase or diminution); and Spacial (change of place and of any of the other species of motion).
Space is defined as the immovable limit of the surrounding body with respect to the body surrounded.
Time is the measure of movement, the aspect of "before" and "after."
The so-called teleology (finality) of nature merits special consideration: nature does, as far as is possible, always that which is more beautiful. The end of nature is the realization of the form in matter, the development of potency into act; but this tendency will never be completely realized because, with the exception of Pure Act (God), the act must exist in potency.
